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Contrary to the widespread belief that eyewitnesses are always fallible and that an eyewitness’ 
confidence is not indicative of identification accuracy, a new body of literature tells a different 
story: A highly confident eyewitness, measured properly (first fair test of memory, immediate 
confidence recorded), is likely to be correct; and conversely, an eyewitness that reports low 
confidence in the same situation is likely making an error. Although there is evidence that jurors 
intuitively understand this strong confidence-accuracy relationship, prior research shows that 
they do not understand the measurement nuances, and that interventions are needed. This 
dissertation reviews some traditional approaches to improving how jurors think about eyewitness 
evidence, like pattern jury instructions and expert testimony, concluding that these approaches 
are too complex and, if anything, simply make jurors skeptical. The present studies designed and 
tested a novel intervention, presenting a simplified message focused on initial eyewitness 
confidence from fair memory test circumstances, using a visual aid with supporting text 
instruction. Overall, the results showed some support for this intervention as an approach to 
sensitizing jurors to eyewitness evidence. Specifically, the intervention sensitized jurors to 
eyewitness confidence inflation, compared to modified Henderson instructions and a control 
condition with no instruction. These results suggest that the visual aid intervention could be a 
viable alternative to traditional approaches, pending further research to validate this novel aid.  
 
Keywords: jury decision-making; skepticism; sensitivity; decision aid; comprehension; 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Both laboratory research and real criminal cases document that eyewitness memory is 
fallible; eyewitnesses sometimes misidentify the perpetrator of the crime they witnessed. This 
has been a contributing factor in at least 34% of the more than 1700 wrongful convictions that 
have been overturned by DNA or other evidence (National Registry of Exonerations, 2018), and 
researchers estimate that this may just be the tip of the iceberg. Laboratory research shows that 
memory can be impacted by a variety of system variables, factors under the control of the legal 
system (e.g. identification procedure, witness instructions, double blind administration), and 
estimator variables, the impact of which can only be estimated (e.g., weapon focus, cross-race, 
exposure duration, lighting) (for a review, see Wells, 1993). This is problematic in and of itself, 
but is magnified when considering the role of eyewitness confidence.  
Confidence can be artificially inflated by factors like post-identification feedback that 
confirm an eyewitness’ choice or by an unfair identification procedure (whereby a suspect stands 
out unduly) (see Key et al., 2017; Neuschatz et al., 2016; Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 
1998). Moreover, the confidence-accuracy correlation is around r = .4, which has been 
interpreted as a relatively weak relationship (Sporer et al., 1995). All these factors led 
researchers to conclude that eyewitnesses are untrustworthy, even when highly confident 
(Deffenbacher, 1980; Sporer et al., 1995). As I will discuss below, this interpretation influenced 
legal cases by way of pattern jury instructions and expert testimony. However, Juslin, Olsson, 
and Winman (1996) showed that the correlation coefficient does not provide the best depiction of 
the confidence-accuracy relationship because it aggregates across all levels of confidence, 
providing a single index of the relationship between confidence and accuracy. In fact, the 




relationship between confidence and accuracy. Juslin et al. argued that the confidence-accuracy 
relationship is better revealed by confidence calibration curves, which depict the proportion of 
accurate judgments made at each level of confidence. This information also answers the question 
of interest to jurors: what is the likelihood that the witness in this case is accurate, given his or 
her level of confidence?  
 A recent body of literature, relying on calibration curves, concludes that eyewitness 
memory can be highly reliable when measured properly, in laboratory research, in field studies, 
and in real criminal cases (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Behrman & Richards, 2005; Brewer & 
Wells, 2006; Garrett, 2011; Gronlund & Benjamin, 2018; Sauerland & Sporer, 2007; Sauerland 
& Sporer, 2009; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015a; Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, 
Clark, & W. Wells, 2015b; Wixted, Mickes, & Fisher, 2018; Wixted & Wells, 2017). For 
example, Wixted et al.’s (2015b) field study revealed that about 95% of eyewitnesses reporting 
the highest level of confidence identified the police suspect, compared with only about 20% of 
low confidence witnesses. These high confidence identifications also were more likely to be 
accompanied by corroborating evidence of guilt. A meta-analysis conducted by Wixted and 
Wells (2017) collapsed across data from 15 laboratory studies varying system and estimator 
variables and found a strong confidence-accuracy relationship. Importantly, this strong 
relationship holds even in the presence of conditions that impair memory accuracy (Semmler 
Dunn, Mickes, & Wixted, 2018). For example, even if there is a weapon present or a cross-race 
identification, both of which impair accuracy, the confidence-accuracy relationship remains 
strong (although there are fewer eyewitnesses who are able to express high confidence under the 




However, two measurement nuances are necessary to expound here: (1) the eyewitness 
must choose someone from the identification procedure, rather than reject the lineup, and (2) the 
confidence judgment must be made immediately after the first, fair test of memory (Wixted et 
al., 2015a). These two nuances are critical for ensuring the reliability of confidence judgments. 
Confidence judgments that are delayed (e.g., those reported in the courtroom, hereafter referred 
to as courtroom confidence), or from an unfair test (e.g., a biased lineup, a single-person showup, 
more than one exposure to the suspect), are less meaningfully related to accuracy due to factors 
like confidence inflation. Confidence inflation typically is defined as an initial expression of low 
confidence but a subsequent expression of higher confidence. Garrett’s (2011) analysis of the 
first 161 DNA exoneration cases revealed that confidence inflation occurred in at least 57% of 
the cases (with missing data for the remainder of cases). In other words, the eyewitnesses making 
initial misidentifications in these cases actually signaled that there was a good chance they were 
making an incorrect identification by reporting low confidence (or choosing a filler or rejecting 
the lineup). Given the high frequency with which confidence inflation occurs, paired with the 
severe consequences that it can have for the justice system, I am interested in two questions:  
1. Do jurors understand that a strong confidence-accuracy relationship exists in eyewitness 
memory?  
2. Do jurors understand its measurement nuances? If not, what interventions can improve 
this understanding?  
To explore these questions, I reviewed the literature on jurors’ behavior, which indicates 
that jurors do understand the strong confidence-accuracy relationship but ignore the 
measurement nuances. I also reviewed the literature on traditional approaches to juror 




alternative method of intervention, which seeks to enhance the ability of jurors to weigh 
eyewitness evidence (i.e., sensitivity). Specifically, I expect to sensitize jurors to the important 
role of initial eyewitness confidence judgments, the problem with confidence inflation, and the 
relatively small impact of system and estimator variables on the confidence-accuracy 
relationship.  
1.1  Jurors’ Behavior Regarding Eyewitness Evidence 
There is no doubt that jurors attend to eyewitness confidence and use this information in 
their decision-making. In fact, research shows that this often may be the only variable that they 
attend to, as it was the only significant predictor of jurors’ perceptions of the evidence and guilt, 
compared to nine other common system and estimator variables (Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, 1988; 
Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, 1990). Jurors also perceive highly confident witnesses as more 
credible, and tend to ignore testimonial inconsistencies of highly confident witnesses (Brewer & 
Burke, 2002). The confidence heuristic, or reliance on a third party’s confidence as an indicator 
of accuracy, likely explains these results (Thomas & McFayden, 1995). Ironically, novices who 
are solving difficult problems or engaging in single-trial decision-making (like jurors) are the 
most likely to rely on the confidence heuristic. Of course, to the extent that the eyewitness is 
actually correct, this is not problematic. However, failure to distinguish between reliable and 
unreliable expressions of eyewitness confidence is problematic and can contribute to wrongful 
convictions. To reiterate, high confidence expressed immediately using a fair test is diagnostic of 
accuracy, but delayed, courtroom confidence judgments, or those arising from an unfair test, are 
often not diagnostic.  
Few studies have directly examined the impact of courtroom confidence judgments on 
jurors’ perceptions and verdict decisions. Bradfield and McQuiston (2004) manipulated whether 




eyewitness. The control condition had the highest rate of guilty verdicts because both the initial 
and courtroom confidence judgments were high. This suggests that jurors do intuitively 
understand that high confidence signals that a suspect is likely guilty. The mere inflation 
condition exhibited confidence inflation from initial to courtroom confidence judgments, but the 
defense attorney did not challenge this. This condition did have lower perceptions of defendant’s 
guilt, eyewitness accuracy, and strength of the prosecution’s case, but did NOT decrease guilty 
verdicts. The only condition with decreased guilty verdicts was the condition in which there was 
confidence inflation, but this was explicitly challenged by the defense attorney. Jones, Williams 
and Brewer (2008) reported that, although 88% of jurors considered confidence inflation to be a 
form of testimonial inconsistency, it did not impact their verdict decisions. Finally, Key et al. 
(accepted pending minor revisions) replicated and extended Bradfield and McQuiston’s (2004) 
study, finding that jurors were seven times as likely to vote guilty when confidence was high 
than when it was low. But, importantly for the present research, Key et al. obtained this pattern 
even for courtroom confidence judgments and when confidence inflation occurred. All that 
mattered was if an eyewitness was ever confident, not that an eyewitness was initially confident.  
These results indicate that, although jurors are attuned to the strong confidence-accuracy 
relationship (higher rates of guilty verdicts when confidence is high), they fail to appreciate the 
measurement nuances under which this relationship holds (first, fair test of memory). The 
outcome of this could be wrongful convictions based on an initially hesitant, but later highly 
confident, eyewitness testimony (i.e., confidence inflation), like Jennifer Thompson’s low 
confidence initial ID of Ronald Cotton (Innocence Project, 2019; Garrett, 2011). This state of 
affairs necessitates intervention. In the next section, I review the traditional interventions that 




1.2 Traditional Approaches to Intervention 
 The two most common interventions in the literature are testimony from an expert 
witness and pattern jury instructions delivered by judges. These instructions, or best practice 
guidelines, are usually written with the help of experts. Keep in mind that the new view of 
eyewitness memory, regarding the strong confidence-accuracy relationship under proper 
conditions, is only recently being endorsed. In fact, the latest surveys of experts revealed that 
most experts endorsed a weak confidence-accuracy relationship (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch & 
Memon, 2001; Simons & Chabris, 2011). As a result, interventions focused on the idea that 
eyewitness memory is fallible and further harmed by a number of system and estimator 
variables. This view of eyewitness memory, when shared with jurors, may not lead to enhanced 
decision-making. To foreshadow, the interventions that arose from this old-science view 
(Gronlund & Benjamin, 2018) of eyewitness memory tended to induce skepticism, or a lower 
proportion of guilty verdicts, compared to a control condition with no instructions. Of course, 
this conservative shift is only good if the suspect is innocent. The ideal intervention will increase 
sensitivity; that is, increase the ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate 
eyewitnesses. A brief history of these interventions follows. 
Expert Witnesses. Experts can be hired by the prosecution, defense, or both. The expert is 
allowed to review the case materials and look for variables that may have impacted eyewitness 
memory (helpful and harmful), write reports, assist the attorneys with preparation for questioning 
and cross-examination, and/or testify to judges/jurors about the eyewitness variables relevant to 
the specific case at hand. The judge must pre-approve the testimony in a Daubert hearing, and 




reviewed publications), offers testimony “beyond the ken” of jurors’ lay-knowledge, and has 
previously testified in similar cases.  
Research shows that adversarial methods of expert testimony, where there are experts 
working for opposing counsel, can improve sensitivity. However, non-adversarial methods, 
where there is a single expert, induce skepticism without improving sensitivity (Cutler, Dexter, 
& Penrod, 1989). Cutler et al. suggested an explanation based on the elaboration likelihood 
model (Petty & Cacioppo, 2012), wherein information is processed at face value (uncritically) if 
the source is credible. A critical evaluation of the evidence is more likely to occur when the 
source is not viewed as credible. Viewed this way, having a single expert, a credible source, 
should not result in a critical evaluation of the evidence; instead, hearing about the variables that 
can harm eyewitness accuracy should result in lower guilty verdicts across the board. A similar 
effect might occur for pattern jury instructions.  
Pattern Jury Instructions. The first set of pattern jury instructions were the Telfaire 
instructions (U.S. v Telfaire, 1972), which contained information about whether the witness had 
capacity and opportunity to view the culprit, whether the identification was a product of the 
witness’ own recollection of the event, and whether the witness was credible. These instructions 
were the same for all cases, and judges exercised no discretion regarding whether to present the 
instructions or not. Research showed that these instructions either had no effect (Cutler, Penrod 
& Dexter, 1990) or induced skepticism across the board compared to a control condition 
(Greene, 1988).  
Revised instructions, called the Henderson instructions, were created in New Jersey and 
contained information about approximately 20 variables that can affect eyewitness memory 




require judges to exercise discretion about which variables are relevant to the case at hand. These 
instructions have come under scrutiny in several news reports and scientific articles for inducing 
skepticism. For example, Papailiou, Yokum, and Robertson (2015) examined the effects of 
instruction type (Telfaire, Henderson) and eyewitness evidence strength (strong, weak) on 
verdict decisions. They predicted an interaction, such that the proportion of guilty verdicts 
should be highest in the Henderson + strong evidence condition and lowest in the Telfaire + 
weak evidence condition. What they found was that Henderson instructions induced even more 
skepticism than the Telfaire instructions in both the strong and weak evidence conditions, with 
only 12% guilty verdicts even in the strong evidence condition (see their Figure 1). In fact, the 
odds of a guilty verdict were 2.55 times higher in the Telfaire than the Henderson instructions. 
Dillon et al. (2017) reached similar conclusions. 
Papailiou et al. (2015) proposed a few reasons for the induced skepticism, including: 
reduced comprehension due to the increased length of the Henderson instructions, poor 
operationalization of what “high” level of the variables means (e.g., what constitutes “high” 
stress?), and implicit trust of the credible expert (judge), whose mere reading of the instructions 
could lead jurors to believe that an eyewitness must be inaccurate. In my opinion, these results 
are not particularly surprising. If giving jurors information about five variables (Telfaire) induces 
skepticism, it is no wonder that giving information about 20 variables (Henderson) induces even 
more skepticism. However, a content analysis of these instructions, covered in the next section, 
points to a different explanation.  
1.3 Content Analysis of Traditional Approaches 
 One could argue that the sheer amount of information presented to jurors is the reason for 




weighing and integrating the multitude of eyewitness variables in a given case to determine 
whether an eyewitness is accurate or not (Strawn & Buchanan, 1975; Strawn & Munsterman, 
1981). Even trained legal professionals could struggle to integrate all of this information. To 
explore this idea further, I compared the information from five sets of best practice guidelines 
and instructions written for police officers, courts (judges), and jurors (see Table 1). The table 
contains the 20 most common eyewitness variables mentioned, organized into system and 
estimator variables. The five sets of guidelines and instructions are organized by the audience: 
police on the far left, courts for the middle three, and jurors on the far right. An “x” indicates that 






Information Contained in Police, Court, and Jury Instructions 










NJ v. Henderson 
(2012) 
System Variables      
Double-blind Admin x x x x x 
Lineup vs Showup x x x x x 
Filler Similarity x x x x x 
Lineup Presentation x x x x x 
Lineup Instructions x x x x x 
Single Suspect x x x x x 
Post-ID Feedback x x x x x 
Co-Witness Contamination x x  x  
# Fillers x x x x x 
Filler Selection Method x x x x  
Mugshot Exposure   x  x 
Audio/Video Recording x x x x  
Estimator Variables      
Cross-Race ID   x x x 
Exposure Time   x x x 
Retention Interval   x x x 
Stress   x x x 
Weapon Focus   x x x 
Intoxication   x  x 
Distance     x 
Lighting     x 
Disguise     x 
Confidence x x x x x 
Note: The “x” denotes that the variable is included in the instructions. 
 
As the table shows, police are instructed about system variables (that are under their 
control) and eyewitness confidence. This makes sense, as the goal of police instructions is to 
ensure the proper collection of the eyewitness evidence. On the other hand, courts and jurors are 
instructed about the system variables, eyewitness confidence, plus estimator variables (around 20 
variables in total). The goal of court and jury instructions is to inform them about factors that 




the eyewitness evidence, but they nevertheless are required to weigh the evidence and ultimately 
make critical decisions about it (suggestible eyewitness procedure, sentencing decisions).  
Furthermore, consider the instructions about eyewitness confidence. Remember, jurors 
intuitively believe that confidence and accuracy are strongly related, and that is the one factor 
that influences their verdict decisions (not the nine other system and estimator variables; see 
Cutler et al., 1988; Cutler et al., 1990). That means that jurors’ natural inclination already 
matches the new view of eyewitness memory—the importance of initial confidence, compared to 
other system and estimator variables. But a closer look at the instructions reveals that only the 
most recent instructions (Yates, 2017; Utah, in prep) portray this view. The instructions currently 
implemented in practice for the courts and jurors (ABA, 2004; NJ v. Henderson, 2012) state that 
there is a weak confidence-accuracy relationship. Given that this is contrary to what jurors 
believe, this might explain why the instructions induce skepticism.  
To summarize, prior research by Bradfield and McQuiston (2004) and others show that 
jurors intuitively understand the strong relationship between confidence and accuracy, but are 
not sensitive to the measurement nuances (first, fair test). Traditional approaches like expert 
testimony and pattern jury instructions tend to induce skepticism rather than improving 
sensitivity. A content analysis revealed that the instructions contain information about 
approximately 20 variables in total (even though these variables hold much less predictive power 
than initial confidence), and portray the confidence-accuracy relationship contrary to what recent 
research shows (and what jurors intuitively believe). Given that in real cases the variables 
involved typically point to conflicting influences (i.e., some variables harm memory, but others 




decision about whether an eyewitness is accurate. It is no surprise that the current approaches are 
not working, and a different intervention is needed. 
1.4  The Current Research 
A simpler message, with fewer variables to consider, might be a better way to improve 
jurors’ sensitivity to eyewitness evidence. Indeed, research by Pennington and Hastie (1991; 
1992) showed that a simple, cohesive story about the evidence is the most compelling to jurors. 
The judgment and decision-making literature has also shown that decision aids that simplify the 
information (e.g., icon arrays, bar or line graphs, pie charts, checklists) improved decision-
making in most studies (Cokely et al., in press; Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013; Garcia-
Retamero & Cokely, 2017; Hamm, Beasley & Johnson, 2014). Other research using a teaching 
aid for eyewitness evidence (i.e., a PowerPoint presentation) also improved sensitivity 
(Pawlenko et al., 2013).  
The simple message about eyewitness memory is that there is a strong confidence-
accuracy relationship under proper measurement conditions. Even variables believed to harm 
memory (system and estimator variables) do not appreciably distort this relationship (Semmler et 
al., 2018; for a review see Gronlund & Benjamin, 2018). Therefore, initial confidence from a 
first, fair test, appears to be the most important factor to consider when determining whether an 
eyewitness is accurate. The goal of the current research is to design an intervention that 
sensitizes jurors to this simplified message.  
Specifically, I designed a novel intervention (hereafter, the Key Intervention) that 
presents the simplified eyewitness message as a visual aid, with supporting text instructions. This 
intervention was inspired by prior work from other domains showing the effectiveness of 




Hastie, 1991; 1992) or by decision aid (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013; 2017; Hamm et al., 
2014). This novel Key Intervention will be compared to a control group—to determine whether 
this new intervention improves sensitivity compared to giving no eyewitness evidence 
instruction—and to a modified Henderson instructions, to determine whether the new 
intervention outperforms those that are currently used in real cases (which induce skepticism, 
Papailiou et al., 2015). My research excluded other traditional interventions: Telfaire instructions 
because they are longer used in most courts, and expert testimony because financial constraints 
often preclude its use. The Key Intervention, however, could be implemented at little cost. To 
reiterate, the goal of this research was to design an intervention that DOES work; the goal was 
NOT to figure out why traditional interventions do not work. 
To that end, I conducted two studies. The first study tested whether the Key Intervention 
improved sensitivity to confidence inflation in a relatively simple eyewitness context. Although 
this study is a good first step in the determining whether a simplified message focused on 
confidence can be effective at sensitizing jurors, it also was important to determine whether the 
new instructions can improve sensitivity to the measurement nuances (first, fair test). 
Specifically, in situations where confidence is no longer predictive of accuracy (not a fair test), 
but is high, can the instructions sensitize mock jurors to ignore confidence? Therefore, 
Experiment 2 included a third factor, memory test fairness. The efficacy of the interventions was 
evaluated using a post-trial questionnaire, comprehension items, and usability and workload 




Chapter 2: Experiment 1  
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Participants were (N = 842) Amazon’s Mechanical Turk jury-eligible workers who were 
compensated a small amount (<$5.00) for participation1. Only those who self-reported being 18+ 
years old with the ability to speak and read English at the high school level or better were 
allowed to complete the study. A total of 88 people did not progress past these criteria for 
participation, and 27 participants dropped out before completing any dependent measures (after 
which, n = 727 usable data points remained). Usable data points were excluded from analysis for 
malingering, operationalized as: completing the study in less than half the median total duration 
for the control condition and failure of two or more (of four) comprehension-check questions. 
This resulted in exclusion of n = 40 additional participants (~5% of the sample), similar to 
previous similar studies (Papailiou et al., 2015; Safer et al., 2016). After exclusion, a final 
sample of N = 687 participants remained for data analysis. This exceeded the ideal sample size of 
N = 640, calculated based on prior research showing that n = 80 per condition is sufficient to 
detect significant effects of interventions (Cutler et al., 1989). The Intuitional Review Board at 
the University of Oklahoma approved this research.  
Not all participants reported demographic information, but of those who did, 42.6% were 
female (of n = 676), and the average age was 20.67 years (SD = 11.9; n = 675). Participants (n = 
674) reported ethnicity as: Caucasian (65.0%), African American (15.7%), Hispanic/Latino 
(4.9%), Native American (1.5%), Asian/Pacific Islander (8.0%), Other (0.1%), No Response 
(1.0%), and Multiple (3.7%). Around one fourth of the sample (26.2%) reported being currently 
                                                 
1 The research was funded by a University of Oklahoma Robberson Research Grant, which was 




in college. Highest level of education was reported as (n = 676): High School/GED (7.4%), 
Some College (27.5%), Bachelor’s Degree (47.3%), Master’s Degree (14.3%), 
Doctoral/Professional Degree (2.1%), Other (0.3%), and No Response (1.0%). Reported political 
affiliations (n = 676) were: Very Conservative (8.7%), Conservative (17.2%), Moderate (21.9%), 
Liberal (30.6%), Very Liberal (18.5%), Other (1.0%), Don’t Know (0.9%), and No Response 
(1.2%). Finally, yearly household income (n = 672) was reported as: $0-$30,000 (18.6%), 
$31,000-$60,000 (37.9%), $61,000-$90,000 (24.9%), $91,000 or more (16.4%), and No 
Response (2.2%). 
2.1.2 Design 
The study conformed to a 2 (Transcript Strength: Strong, Weak) x 3 (Intervention: Key 
Intervention, Modified Henderson, Control) between-participants design. In the Strong version 
of the transcript, the eyewitness was 90% confident initially and in court; in the Weak transcript, 
confidence inflated from 20% initially to 90% in court. The Key Intervention was a visual aid 
depicting a balance beam, on which confidence measured properly had more weight than 
confidence arising from any other circumstances. Text instructions supported this aid, stating in 
words that confidence is predictive of accuracy if measured properly, as well as how to interpret 
the balance beam2 (see Appendix A). The original Henderson instructions were modified by 
simplifying the language, removing redundant sentences, and correcting the confidence-accuracy 
relationship instruction (the modified instruction matched the content regarding confidence in the 
Key Intervention, see Appendix C). These modifications reduced the word count from around 
                                                 
2 Note: The balance beam was chosen as the visual aid because pilot testing revealed that it 




2300 words in original Henderson to around 600 words in the modified Henderson. The Control 
condition contained no instructions regarding eyewitness evidence. 
The primary dependent variables were verdict decisions, post-trial questionnaire items, 
comprehension check questions, usability and workload items, and total duration. Demographics 
(gender, age, ethnicity, education, political orientation, and income) and cognitive measures 
(numeracy and graph literacy) were also included as covariates, as these variables may relate to 
decision making and comprehension of visual aids (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017; Ybarra, 
2018).  
2.1.3 Materials 
The mock trial, adapted from prior research (Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004; Key et al., 
accepted pending minor revisions), describes the fictitious case of People v. Roger Sanchez. Mr. 
Sanchez is charged with threatening and robbing Ms. Cameron of her purse, its contents, and 
$730 cash. Mr. Sanchez was arrested a short distance from the scene of the crime because he 
matched the general description of the culprit given to police. He had $700 in cash on his person. 
He was later identified by Mrs. Cameron from a police lineup as the man who stole her purse, 
and her confidence was expressed initially and in the courtroom. Mr. Sanchez claims that he was 
misidentified and that the cash he was carrying was from his paycheck. 
The transcript begins with direct examination of the witness by the prosecution, and she 
is asked to describe the crime, the perpetrator, and give a courtroom confidence judgment (90%). 
This is followed by cross-examination by the defense attorney, during which the witness is asked 
to provide the confidence judgment she gave initially after ID (20% or 90%), and she is 
questioned about system and estimator variables that may have impacted her accuracy. A total of 




variables harm eyewitness accuracy, 4 favor eyewitness accuracy and the prosecution). These 
were held constant in the strong and weak versions of the transcript, so that the only manipulated 
variable in the transcript was the eyewitness confidence inflation. See Appendix D for the full 
trial transcript. 
The pre-deliberation instructions were adapted from the Henderson instructions (see 
Appendix E), reduced from 675 words to about 175.  
The post-trial questionnaire items were adapted from prior research (Bradfield & 
McQuiston, 2004; Key et al., accepted pending minor revisions). The post-trial questionnaire 
included 17 questions regarding: verdict decisions, strength of the evidence and sentencing 
recommendation, the witnessing conditions, and beliefs about eyewitness memory in general. 
Verdict decision was dichotomous (1=guilty, 2=not guilty). All other questions were reported on 
Likert scales ranging from 1 to 10, where higher values on the scale favor the prosecution. See 
Appendix F for the post-trial questionnaire.  
The comprehension check questions were adapted from prior research (Bradfield & 
McQuiston, 2004; Key et al., accepted pending minor revisions). There were four multiple-
choice questions about basic case facts, including: type of crime, the defendant’s name, whether 
the witness identified a suspect, and what the witness was threatened with. To ensure participants 
paid attention to the eyewitness’ confidence judgments, they were asked to choose initial and 
courtroom confidence percentages from a list (10% increments), and rate whether the courtroom 
confidence was greater than, equal to, or less than the initial confidence.  See Appendix G for 
comprehension check items. 
Usability was measured with six items based on the System Usability Scale (SUS; 




strongly agree. Workload was measured with the six items from the NASA TLX (Hart & 
Staveland 1988), where 0 = lowest, 10 = highest. Participants were asked to rank how they felt 
while weighing all the information presented to them about the case People v. Sanchez. See 
Appendix H for the usability and workload items.  
Numeracy was measured with the Berlin Numeracy Test-Schwartz (BNT-S) (Cokely et 
al., 2012), which is a combination of the four BNT items and the three easy items from the 
Schwartz et al. (1997) test. Graph literacy was measured with the difficult subset of multiple-
choice items from Woller-Carter (2015).  Participants were allowed to use a calculator and/or 
scratch paper.  
2.1.4 Procedure 
 Participants completed the study individually rather than together as real jurors would, 
and the entire study was self-paced. Participants gave informed consent and self-reported 
whether they were age 18 or older and spoke and read English at the high school level or better. 
Anyone who did not meet these inclusion criteria were not allowed to continue. Participants were 
instructed to pay close attention to the trial transcript, because their responses could influence the 
outcome of real cases. On the same page, they read a summary of the case facts before 
proceeding to the transcript. The transcript was divided into several sections, each of which 
appeared on a different page of the survey. Participants read the trial transcript, pre-deliberation 
instructions and received the intervention. Then they completed the post-trial questionnaire 
items, comprehension check items, usability, workload, cognitive ability measures and 
demographic items. Finally, they were thanked for their participation and received payment. Due 
to experimenter error, the cognitive ability measures and some of the post-trial questionnaire 





I expected that the Key Intervention would improve juror sensitivity compared to the 
Modified Henderson instructions, which should induce skepticism, and the Control condition, 
which should show no difference across Strong and Weak evidence conditions. Other metrics, 
including comprehension, usability, and workload, were also explored. 
The data were analyzed using a series of regression models (logistic regression for 
verdict decision, linear regression for all other dependent variables). To maintain a family-wise 
error rate of α = .05, a Holm-Bonferroni correction was used for each model; the p values 
reported in this manuscript are the adjusted p values. For all models, the Key Intervention 
condition served as the reference class, to test the hypothesis that this condition outperforms the 
other two. The results are reported first for the dependent measures completed by all participants 
in the study (Full Sample, n = 687), and then for the measures that only a subset of participants 
completed (Subset, n = 200). Only the findings of interest are reported in text, but full reporting 
of each model and graphs displaying results are contained in Appendix I (Full Sample) and 
Appendix J (Subset).  A correlation matrix for the covariates is reported in Table 2.  
Table 2.          
Correlation Matrix of Covariates 
  Numer Grap Gend Age Ethnici Educat Political  Inco 
Numeracy 1 0.54 -0.12 0.17 -0.14 0.02 0.08 0.01 
GraphLiteracy 0.54 1 0.05 0.13 -0.2 -0.02 0.12 0.03 
Gender -0.12 0.05 1 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.14 
Age 0.17 0.13 0.12 1 -0.16 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 
Ethnicity -0.14 -0.2 0.12 -0.16 1 0.39 0.25 0.16 
Education 0.02 -0 0.11 -0.02 0.39 1 0.13 0.42 
Political 
Orientation 0.08 0.12 0.17 -0.01 0.25 0.13 1 0.1 







2.2.1 Verdict Decisions 
Full Sample. A logistic regression was used to determine whether verdict was predicted 
by the manipulations and demographic variables. A log-likelihood test evaluated the overall fit of 
the model. The overall model was significant, indicating differences in verdict across conditions, 
χ2 (df = 12) = -410.04, p < .0001, AIC = 844.09, r2 = .12. Verdict varied significantly by 
Transcript Strength, B = -1.64 (SE = .29), z = -5.49, p = < .0001: Jurors voted guilty more in the 
Strong (65%) than the Weak (36%) transcripts, indicating sensitivity to the differences in 
eyewitness evidence quality across the two conditions. The Key Intervention did have a higher 
rate of guilty verdicts (54%), but this did not differ significantly from the Modified Henderson 
(46%) or the Control condition (50%), ps > .68, see Figure 1. Verdict also varied as a function of 
Ethnicity, B = .21 (SE = .07), z = 3.01, p = .03 and Political Orientation, B = -.25 (SE = .06), z = -
3.89, p = .001. Those of minority ethnicity voted guilty less often, as did those with liberal 
political orientation. No other significant differences emerged, including interactions between 





Figure I.1. Average VERDICT as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention type. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Note: this figure reappears in Appendix I for 
convenience. 
 
Subset of Sample. Adding numeracy and graph literacy to the model did not change its 
overall fit, and these variables did not emerge as significant predictors of verdict decisions, ps > 
.20. In fact, no predictors were significant, ps > .11.  
2.2.2 Post-Trial Questionnaire Items 
 Full Sample. The post-trial questionnaire item results tell a similar story. Intervention did 




Strength significantly predicted average rating for Likelihood of Guilt and Confidence in 
Witness: There were higher averages (favoring the prosecution) in the Strong than Weak 
evidence condition. Interestingly, Evidence Strength also influenced Courtroom Confidence 
Predicts Verdict (strong M = 7.00, SD = 2.63; weak M = 5.59, SD = 2.91), but not Initial 
Confidence Predicts Verdict (strong M = 7.30, SD = 2.55; weak M = 7.60, SD = 2.41). The two 
takeaways from these results are: 1) participants are more persuaded by courtroom confidence in 
the strong evidence condition (perhaps because it confirms the initial confidence judgment, 
rather than conflicting with it), and 2) participants have higher averages for (are more influenced 
by) initial than courtroom confidence judgments made by the witness. In other words, they 
appear to be already sensitive to confidence inflation, and this could explain why the Key 
Intervention had little impact.  
Ethnicity and Political Orientation were also significant predictors for the post-trial 
questionnaire items, with minority ethnicity and liberal political orientation giving ratings that 
favored the defense, on average. For Confidence Inflation Equals Accuracy, Education emerged 
as a significant predictor (p = .04), suggesting that those higher in education are more 
knowledgeable about how confidence inflation over time signals a witness less likely to be 
accurate. The only variable that had no significant predictors was Confidence in Verdict, 
indicating that jurors’ confidence in their own decision-making did not vary as a function of the 
manipulations or any demographic variables. 
Subset of Sample. Remember, some post-trial questionnaire items were not included for 
all participants, so a richer story is revealed for the subset of participants who completed all 
items. Transcript Strength was a significant predictor of the post-trial questionnaire items 




Verdict, Confidence in Witness, and Witness Memory. This is evidence of improved sensitivity 
for the variables that were the focus of the Key Intervention, in support of my hypothesis. But 
there were no significant predictors of witnessing conditions (e.g., Attention, Good Basis for ID), 
Case Strength, ratings of Witness Accuracy, and beliefs about eyewitnesses in general 
(Eyewitness Accuracy General, Confidence Predicts Accuracy, or Confidence Inflation Occurs). 
This makes sense, as these were not part of the Key Intervention, so improved sensitivity should 
not have occurred.  
Including cognitive abilities in the models negated the predictive power of all 
demographic variables, except that Political Orientation predicted Sentence Recommendation 
(with heavier sentences given by those who identified as conservative). Graph literacy emerged 
as a significant predictor of Sentence Recommendation, Witness Accuracy, Attention, Witness 
Memory and Confidence Inflation Equals Accuracy. These findings may signal that those higher 
in graph literacy evaluated the witness in light of diagnostic information (i.e., her confidence), 
whereas those lower in graph literacy may not have. Numeracy did not predict any post-trial 
questionnaire items.  
2.2.3 Comprehension Check Questions  
Full Sample. For comprehension check questions, the overall model was significant, 
indicating significant differences in comprehension, F (11, 656) = 6.38, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = 
.08. Comprehension did not vary as a function of Transcript Strength or Intervention, or their 
interactions. This finding makes sense, as the comprehension questions pertained to information 




not have any bearing on comprehension scores). Comprehension scores were higher with Age, 
lower with Education3, and higher with more liberal Political Orientation.  
Participants were also asked to indicate the witness’ initial and courtroom confidence 
judgment as a percentage. Transcript Strength significantly predicted Initial Confidence but not 
Courtroom Confidence. Remember, initial confidence percentage was the key manipulation of 
transcript strength, so these findings indicate that participants paid attention to the witness’ 
confidence judgments.  
Subset of Sample. Transcript Strength significantly predicted Initial Confidence 
Percentage and a judgment of whether the courtroom confidence judgment was higher, lower, or 
equal to initial confidence. Transcript Strength did not predict Courtroom Confidence Percentage 
itself, although Graph Literacy did, B = .11 (SE = .03), t = 3.27, p = .02). Graph Literacy also 
predicted comprehension score, B = .04 (SE = .01), t = 3.89, p = .002; Numeracy did not.  
2.2.4 Usability and Workload 
Full Sample. The overall model for usability was significant, F (11, 657) = 12.29, p < 
.0001, adjusted r2 = .16; the overall average usability score (B0) was 7.44 (SD = .40) on a 11-
point scale. Usability did not differ as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention, or their 
interactions. However, usability scores were higher with Age, lower with Education, and higher 
with more liberal Political Orientation. The same pattern occurred for workload, overall model 
fit F (11, 657) = 11.97, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .15. The overall average workload score (B0) 
                                                 
3 The reader may be wondering why the coefficient for education was negative, indicating a 
potential suppressor effect. However, a single regression model using education as the sole 
predictor of comprehension also yielded a negative coefficient, B = -0.12 (SE = .03), t = -4.98, p 
< .0001. In fact, this negative coefficient of education occurred for comprehension, usability, and 
workload (Experiment 1 and 2) even when it was the sole predictor in the model. The 




was 5.72 (SE = .41) on a 11-point scale. Workload did not differ as a function of Evidence 
Strength, Intervention, or their interactions. However, higher workload scores were associated 
with lower Age, higher Education, and more conservative Political Orientation. 
Subset of Sample. Adding Numeracy and Graph Literacy as predictors did not change the 
null findings for the manipulated variables. However, the effects of the demographic variables 
were no longer significant, and Graph Literacy emerged as a significant predictor of Usability, B 
= .15 (SE = .05), t = 3.14, p = .03, and of Workload, B = -.19 (SE = .05), t = -4.00, p = .001. In 
sum, the averages indicate reasonable usability and workload for all of the interventions, and 
only demographic variables and graph literacy (not manipulations) predicted the scores.  
2.3 Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to compare a novel intervention (i.e., the Key 
Intervention) presenting a simplified message about eyewitness evidence using a visual aid, to a 
traditional jury intervention, which induces skepticism, and a Control condition with no 
eyewitness information. This was done in a relatively simple trial context focused on eyewitness 
evidence that manipulated evidence strength through confidence (consistently high—90%—in 
the Strong condition, inflated in the Weak condition—20% to 90%).  
I expected the Key Intervention to improve juror sensitivity compared to the Modified 
Henderson instructions, which should induce skepticism, and the Control condition, which 
should show no difference across Strong and Weak evidence conditions. Although there were 
trends in these directions, there were no significant differences across Interventions for any of 
the dependent variables. Instead, participants appeared to be already sensitive to the evidence, 
favoring the prosecution much more given the Strong than the Weak transcript. This might be 
due to the magnitude of the inflation, which was exaggerated compared to what had been used in 




pending minor revisions, rather than 20% to 90% here). In the current study, perhaps the 
exaggerated inflation used here increased jurors’ sensitivity to the confidence evidence, leaving 
little room for the Intervention to have an impact.  
To provide a stronger test of the hypothesis that the Key Intervention should outperform 
traditional interventions, Experiment 2 extended this work by mimicking the confidence inflation 
used in previous research (50% to 90%). My expectation was that this would reduce the 
sensitivity that participants demonstrated in Experiment 1, thus allowing more room for the 
interventions to have an impact. Moreover, Experiment 2 used a more ambiguous and 
ecologically valid trial context, including the manipulation of memory test fairness (expressed 
via the testimony of the investigating law enforcement officer). I hypothesized that if the Key 
Intervention really does work, mock jurors should be sensitive to the confidence inflation, such 
that they favor the prosecution more given the Strong than Weak transcript. But importantly, this 
sensitivity should only occur when the memory test is fair. Given an unfair memory test, the 
Strong and Weak transcripts should yield similar favor to the prosecution, because the initial 
confidence did not arise from a fair memory test, and therefore the reliance on confidence should 
be downplayed even if there is no confidence inflation.   
Chapter 3: Experiment 2  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Participants were (N = 945) jury-eligible adults of Qualtrics panel members and 




participation4. Only those who self-reported being age 18+ years old with the ability to speak and 
read English at the high school level or better were allowed to complete the study. A total of 87 
people did not progress past these criteria for participation, and 26 participants dropped out 
before completing any dependent measures (after which, n = 831 usable data points remained). 
Usable data points were excluded from analysis for malingering, operationalized as: completing 
the study in less than half the median total duration for the control condition and failure of two or 
more (of four) comprehension-check questions. This resulted in exclusion of n = 41 participants 
(~5% of the usable sample, similar to previous similar studies, Papailiou et al., 2015; Safer et al., 
2016). After exclusion, a final sample of N = 790 participants remained for data analysis. This 
fell short of the ideal sample size of N = 960, calculated based on prior research showing that n = 
80 per condition is sufficient to detect significant effects of interventions (Cutler et al., 1989)5. 
The Intuitional Review Boards at University of Oklahoma and University of Alabama in 
Huntsville approved this research.  
Not all participants reported demographic information, but of those who did, 52.2% were 
female (n = 740), and the average age was 22.18 years (SD = 13.02; n = 736). Participants (n = 
738) reported ethnicity as: Caucasian (65.7%), African American (10.6%), Hispanic/Latino 
(6.4%), Native American (1.2%), Asian/Pacific Islander (10.2%), Other (0.7%), No Response 
(1.2%), and Multiple (4.1%). Around one-fourth of the sample (27.6%) reported being currently 
in college. Highest level of education was reported as (n = 740): High School/GED (8.2%), 
Some College (28.2%), Bachelor’s Degree (41.4%), Master’s Degree (17.6%), 
                                                 
4 The research was funded by University of Oklahoma Robberson Research Grant, partially 
matched by psychology department funds, and an internal research grant from University of 
Alabama in Huntsville.  




Doctoral/Professional Degree (2.8%), Other (0.7%), and No Response (1.1%). Reported political 
affiliations (n = 739) were: Very Conservative (8.8%), Conservative (21.0%), Moderate (25.0%), 
Liberal (27.9%), Very Liberal (12.9%), Other (.8%), Don’t Know (1.1%), and No Response 
(2.6%). Finally, yearly household income (n = 733) was reported as: $0-$30,000 (21.1%), 
$31,000-$60,000 (33.7%), $61,000-$90,000 (23.9%), $91,000 or more (17.9%), and No 
Response (3.4%). 
3.1.2 Design 
 The study employed a 2 (Transcript Strength: Strong, Weak) x 3 (Intervention: Key 
Intervention, Modified Henderson, Control) x 2 (Memory Test: Fair, Unfair) between-
participants design. Again, Transcript Strength was manipulated via eyewitness confidence 
ratings, but in this experiment confidence inflated from 50% to 90% in the Weak condition; 
confidence was consistently high at 90% in the Strong condition. The Fair memory test includes 
a fair lineup and double-blind lineup administration; the Unfair memory test includes a biased 
lineup (in which the suspect is described as standing out) and single-blind lineup administration.    
3.1.3 Materials  
The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1, with two exceptions. First, 
the confidence inflation was less exaggerated (50% to 90%), mimicking previous research 
(Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004; Key et al., accepted pending minor revisions). Second, the 
transcript included testimony of the investigating law enforcement officer. This testimony 
focused on how the lineup was created and administered; this is how Memory Test fairness was 
manipulated.   
3.1.4 Procedure 





I expected that the Key Intervention would improve juror sensitivity compared to the 
Control condition and Modified Henderson instructions (which should induce skepticism). 
However, if the instructions truly sensitize jurors, this pattern should be observed for the fair 
memory test only—not for the unfair memory test. In the unfair memory test condition, the 
“strong” confidence evidence did not arise from a proper test of memory, so there should be no 
difference between the Strong and Weak evidence conditions.  
The data were analyzed using a series of regression models (logistic regression for 
verdict decision, linear regression for all other dependent variables). To maintain a family-wise 
error rate of α = .05, a Holm-Bonferroni correction was used for each model; the p values 
reported in this manuscript are the adjusted p values. For all models, the Key Intervention served 
as the reference class to test the hypothesis that this condition improved sensitivity compared to 
the others. Only the findings of interest are reported in text, but see Appendix K for the full 
reporting of each model with graphs displaying the results. See Table 3 for a correlation matrix 
of covariates.  
Table 3.          
Correlation Matrix of Covariates 
  Nume Graph Gend Age Ethnic Educat Political Inco 
Numeracy 1 0.54 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.16 0.11 
Graph 
Literacy 0.54 1 0.04 0.11 -0.01 -0.12 0.21 0.08 
Gender -0.01 0.04 1 0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.09 
Age 0.07 0.11 0.14 1 -0.15 0.02 -0.05 0.01 
Ethnicity -0.02 -0 -0.03 -0.15 1 0.15 0.17 0.09 
Education -0.01 -0.1 -0.02 0.02 0.15 1 -0.02 0.31 
Political 
Orientation 0.16 0.21 0.09 -0.05 0.17 -0.02 1 0.04 





3.2.1 Verdict Decisions 
Full Sample. A logistic regression was used to determine whether verdict was predicted 
by the manipulations and covariates. A log-likelihood test evaluated the overall fit of the model. 
The overall model was significant, indicating differences in verdict across conditions, χ2 (df = 
20) = -445.62, p < .0001, AIC = 931.23, r2 = .11. There was an effect of Transcript Strength, as 
verdicts were higher in the Strong (54%) than Weak (39%) transcripts, B = -1.49 (SE = .41), z = -
3.68, p < .0004. At first glance, this result could be taken to mean that the change to 50% 
confidence in the trial transcript did not have the intended effect of reducing sensitivity. But as 
can be seen in Figure 2, the difference between Strong and Weak is limited to the Key 
Intervention in the Fair memory test (confidence intervals do not overlap). This supports my 
primary hypothesis that the Key Intervention would sensitize jurors to confidence inflation only 






Figure K.1. Average VERDICT percentage as a function of Transcript Strength, 
Intervention type, and Memory Test Fairness. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Note: Figure reappears in Appendix K for convenience. 
 
As further evidence of this conclusion, when collapsing across Transcript Strength and 
Intervention type the other experimental manipulations, verdict did not differ between Fair 
(50%) and Unfair (43%) memory test conditions, B = -.37 (SE = .42), z = -.10, p > .05.  
Moreover, collapsing across Memory Test Fairness and Transcript Strength, the Key 
Intervention did have a higher rate of guilty verdicts (51%), although it did not differ 
significantly from the Modified Henderson (41%) or the Control condition (47%), Bs < -.79, zs < 
-2.00, ps > .58. Only when the Key Intervention is paired with the Fair memory test does 




way and 3-way interactions, except for one covariate, Graph Literacy, B = -.13 (SE = .03), z = -
4.78, p < .0001.   
3.2.2 Post-Trial Questionnaire Items 
 The post-trial questionnaire item results tell a similar story. The experimental 
manipulations did not appreciably predict averages for most post-trial questionnaire items, 
although the averages for many items are higher (non-overlapping CIs) in Strong than Weak for 
the Key Intervention. The Key Intervention improved understanding for Initial Confidence 
Influenced Verdict compared to the control condition, B = 1.40 (SE = .45), t = 3.07, p = .04. This 
provides some evidence that the Key Intervention sensitized jurors to the pertinent information 
(i.e., initial confidence).  
Political Orientation was a significant predictor of most post-trial questionnaire items. 
Conservative political orientation was associated with higher agreement with questions 
pertaining to the eyewitness in this case and to general eyewitness beliefs, signaling a bias 
favoring the prosecution. Graph Literacy also emerged as a significant predictor of most post-
trial questionnaire items, with ratings favoring the prosecution being associated with a lower 
Graph Literacy score. Numeracy significantly predicted Confidence in Verdict, but did not 
predict any other post-trial questionnaire items.   
3.2.3 Comprehension Check Questions  
For comprehension check questions, the overall model was significant, indicating 
significant differences in comprehension, F (19, 707) = 15.34, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .27. Average 
comprehension (B0) was 2.89 out of 4 (SE = .12), t = 24.09, p < .0001. Comprehension did not 
vary as a function of Transcript Strength, Lineup Fairness, Intervention, or their interactions. This 




experimental manipulations. Comprehension scores were lower with Education, B = -.07 (SE = 
.02), t = -3.75, p = .003, and higher with Graph Literacy, B = .06 (SE = .006), t = 9.70, p < .0001.  
To ascertain whether participants paid attention to the witness’ confidence judgment, they 
were asked to indicate initial and courtroom confidence of the witness, as well as make a rating 
of whether the courtroom confidence judgment was higher, lower, or equal to initial confidence. 
There were significant differences across Strong and Weak transcripts for initial confidence 
percentage and the ranking, but not courtroom confidence. As the transcript did contain 
differences in confidence initially but not in the courtroom, this indicates participants attended to 
the confidence judgments. This may be particularly the case for those higher in Graph Literacy, 
as it was also a significant predictor for Initial and Courtroom Confidence percentages. 
3.2.4 Usability and Workload 
The overall model for usability was significant, F (19, 707) = 18.63, p < .0001, adjusted 
r2 = .32; the overall average usability score (B0) was 6.28 on a 11-point scale (SE = .38), t = 
16.75, p < .0001. Usability did not differ as a function of Transcript Strength, Lineup Fairness, 
Intervention, or their interactions. However, usability scores were higher with Age, B = .02 (SE = 
.005), t = 3.97, p = .001, lower with minority Ethnicity, B = -.14 (SE = .04), t = -3.50, p = .008, 
and lower with Education, B = -.28 (SE = .06), t = -4.76, p < .0001. Higher usability was also 
associated with higher Graph Literacy, B = .20 (SE = .02), t = 10.48, p < .0001. 
The same pattern occurred for workload, overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 23.63, p < 
.0001, adjusted r2 = .37. The overall average workload score (B0) was 8.59 on a 11-point scale 
(SE = .37), t = 22.78, p < .0001). Workload did not differ as a function of Transcript Strength, 
Lineup Fairness, Intervention, or their interactions. However, higher workload scores were 




(SE = .04), t = 3.51, p = .008, higher Education, B = .38 (SE = .06), t = 6.41, p < .0001, and more 
conservative Political Orientation, B = -.25 (SE = .04), t = -6.12, p < .0001. Higher workload was 
also associated with lower Graph Literacy, B = -.22 (SE = .02), t = -11.50, p < .0001. 
3.3 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the Key Intervention significantly 
improved sensitivity, but only when the memory test was fair. This should be the case because 
confidence arising from an unfair memory test is not a reliable indicator of accuracy, and should 
not be weighted more heavily in the Strong (90% confidence consistently) than Weak transcript 
(confidence inflation from 50% to 90%). As expected, the change in confidence inflation (from 
20% to 90% in Experiment 1 to 50% to 90% in Experiment 2) greatly reduced the differences 
between Strong and Weak transcripts observed in Experiment 1. There also were no differences 
across memory test fairness. This reduced sensitivity across the board allowed room for the 
intervention to play a role. Specifically, in line with my primary hypothesis, the Key Intervention 
did show improved sensitivity in verdicts (difference between strong and weak) for the Fair 
memory test only, whereas the other two interventions did not. This pattern also held for some 
key post-trial questionnaire items, with ratings favoring the prosecution only when the evidence 
was actually strong (Fair test).  
Most covariates were not statistically associated with the dependent variables of interest, 
with a few exceptions of note. Age, Ethnicity, and Education predicted usability and workload,. 
Political Orientation was a significant predictor of most post-trial questionnaire items, with 
conservative political affiliation being associated with higher agreement on questions pertaining 
to witness-specific and eyewitness-general beliefs—signaling a bias favoring the prosecution.  
Graph Literacy also emerged as a significant predictor of most post-trial questionnaire 




Literacy. This may indicate that those higher in Graph Literacy evaluated the witness using 
diagnostic information about her (i.e., her confidence), whereas those lower in graph literacy 
may not have. Moreover, numeracy was shown to be a significant predictor of Confidence in 
Verdict, replicating prior work showing that numeracy predicts decision-making confidence 
(Cokely et al., in press).  
Chapter 4: General Discussion 
Contrary to the widely touted view that eyewitness memory is not reliable and that 
eyewitness confidence can be high even when inaccurate, a newer body of literature modifies 
this conclusion: an initially confident witness is likely to be accurate, compared to a low 
confidence witness, assuming proper measurement. Even some system and estimator variables 
that are thought to distort accuracy do not appreciably impact the confidence-accuracy 
relationship (Semmler et al., 2018, Wixted & Wells, 2017). Research from Cutler and colleagues 
(Cutler et al., 1988; Cutler et al., 1990) shows that jurors already focus on eyewitness confidence 
and disregard other variables when making verdict decisions. However, they are not sensitive to 
the measurement nuances, as their verdict decisions are not impacted by when the confidence 
judgment occurred (initially or not) nor by confidence inflation across time (Bradfield & 
McQuiston, 2004; Key et al., accepted pending minor revisions). Moreover, the traditional 
approaches to intervention, like expert testimony and pattern jury instructions, do not improve 
sensitivity.  
 A content analysis of these approaches revealed two possible explanations for jurors’ 
skepticism, not sensitivity: (a) the instructions contain information about ~20 eyewitness system 
and estimator variables, which may be difficult to integrate into a coherent conclusion about 




instructions contain the mistaken message that confidence and accuracy are not related, which 
conflicts with jurors’ intuitive understanding. To overcome these issues, I tested the idea that a 
simpler message, focused on initial confidence and disregarding the other system and estimator 
variables, may improve sensitivity compared to the traditional interventions. Specifically, I 
designed a new intervention (the Key Intervention), which presented the simplified message 
using a visual aid with supporting text instructions. This novel intervention was pitted against a 
modified version of the Henderson instructions currently used in real court cases, and a control 
condition with no eyewitness instruction. This was done in a relatively simple criminal trial 
context, where confidence inflation was the only difference between strong and weak evidence 
conditions (Experiment 1) and in a more complex scenario where memory test fairness was also 
manipulated (Experiment 2).  
 Experiment 1 showed that, surprisingly, mock jurors were already sensitive to confidence 
inflation. Thus, there was no room for intervention type to appreciably impact verdicts or other 
measures. I hypothesized that this was due to the exaggerated inflation (20% to 90%) in the 
current study compared to previous research showing no sensitivity (Bradfield & McQuiston, 
2004; Key et al., accepted pending minor revisions). Thus, Experiment 2 modified the research 
by reverting to confidence inflation similar to what was used by previous research (50% to 90%), 
and expanded the research by adding a manipulation of memory test fairness. If the Key 
Intervention really sensitizes jurors, sensitization should occur only when the confidence arose 
from a fair memory test. The methodology change was an improvement, as the sensitivity effect 
from Experiment 1 was reduced, making room for the interventions to have an effect. 




items were higher in Strong than Weak in the Key Intervention, and importantly, only for Fair 
memory test.  
There were no significant differences between evidence conditions (i.e., a lack of 
sensitivity) for the modified Henderson and the control condition. This is in line with the 
hypothesis that these two interventions would not improve sensitivity. Somewhat surprisingly 
though, the modified Henderson instruction did not induce skepticism (lower verdicts across all 
conditions), as expected. This could be because the modifications I undertook to the Henderson 
instructions by reducing the length and simplifying the legal terminology included in the original 
Henderson, either of which could have been driving the skepticism effect normally found 
(Papailiou et al., 2015). But the modified Henderson still included several secondary details 
about eyewitness memory (i.e., various system and estimator variables), which is likely why this 
condition did not improve sensitivity. Comprehension may also have been positively affected by 
these modifications, as there were no differences across intervention type for these metrics.  
 The goal of these studies was to design an intervention that significantly outperformed 
those currently used in real cases (original Henderson and expert witnesses). These studies 
provide some evidence that the Key Intervention might satisfy that aim. As expected, verdicts 
were higher in the Strong than Weak eyewitness evidence condition, but only when the memory 
test was fair. This pattern also held for some post-trial questionnaire items. However, the Key 
Intervention did not improve the other metrics of interest, including usability, workload, or 
comprehension compared to the other interventions. This might be because the modifications to 
Henderson improved understanding of the information compared to the original Henderson, such 
that this condition did not perform less favorably than the others. Overall, these findings suggest 




as the Key Intervention, perhaps is better than what is currently used (although this would need 
to be tested explicitly by comparing how the modified Henderson fares to the original).  
Of course, the present studies are not without limitations. These studies manipulated 
evidence strength via the eyewitness confidence judgment (consistently high versus confidence 
inflation). Future research could manipulate other eyewitness variables (i.e., those not included 
in the current studies), or could even include other types of evidence (confession, forensic 
evidence). These other variables may well trump eyewitness confidence, and this is important to 
know. Another major limitation is that some system variables (e.g., double-blind administration, 
fair lineup creation) may be necessary to ensure that the confidence judgment came from a first, 
fair test. Instructing jurors to disregard these factors (as the Key Intervention does) may actually 
harm their decision-making, an idea that will be important to test in future research. Despite 
these limitations, the current studies add to the literature by testing a novel approach to jury 
intervention, and provides some evidence for the Key Intervention being a successful approach 
to enhancing sensitivity to eyewitness evidence, at least under the tested circumstances. 
Adoption of the Key intervention in the legal system is uncertain though, because each 
jurisdiction chooses its own methodology for court proceedings. Its utility may also be impacted 
by individual differences among jurors (i.e., demographics and cognitive abilities), and 
overcoming this barrier will be difficult, because the legal standard is to select a jury of peers. As 
an alternative to intervening with all jurors who need to deliberate about the evidence, it may be 
easier to intervene on behalf of judges. Specifically, judges are expected to be gatekeepers of 
eyewitness evidence, disallowing overly suggestive eyewitness procedures. Can judges reliably 
apply higher standards regarding suggestibility by admitting eyewitness confidence evidence 




constitutes a fair memory test, which could be presented to judges using a decision aid. A 
checklist of criteria, a decision tree, or the balance beam used in the Key Intervention, may be 
viable decision aids to use in this context. However, what constitutes fair is still under debate in 
the scientific literature (see Wixted & Wells, 2017, and a response by Mickes, Clark & 
Gronlund, 2018, for a discussion of some basic criteria). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that 
subject factors (e.g., self-efficacy; face recognition ability) may account for at least as much 
variance in confidence as does accuracy (Grabman, Dobolyi, Berelovich, & Dodson, 2019; 
Kantner & Dobbins, 2019). In other words, the robustness of the confidence-accuracy 
relationship is under scrutiny. Perhaps in the future, judges can disallow evidence from 
eyewitnesses whose subject factors predict they have poor face memory or are not well 
calibrated; but exactly which subject factors matter is still being explored. Thus, it is unclear 
when the judges-as-gatekeepers solution could be implemented, or whether it would even be 
effective. However, the Key Intervention could be implemented immediately, and sensitizes 
mock jurors to the most important eyewitness evidence researchers agree on now (confidence 
inflation).   
 In conclusion, these studies designed and tested a novel approach to juror intervention, 
utilizing a visual aid and simplified message regarding eyewitness evidence. This new 
intervention, the Key Intervention, effectively sensitized mock jurors to confidence inflation of 
the eyewitness. Importantly, it also sensitized them to the measurement nuances necessary to 
ensure the reliable recording of eyewitness confidence judgments. This intervention seems to be 
a significant improvement over current approaches used by the legal system, and if implemented, 
would be expected to improve jury decision making in criminal cases involving eyewitness 
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Although it is commonly believed that there are many variables that can make eyewitnesses less 
accurate, like stress or poor viewing conditions, new research shows that these variables do not 
matter as much as eyewitness confidence. If an eyewitness is highly confident initially, they are 
very likely to be accurate. If an eyewitness is not confident initially, they are much less likely to 
be accurate. However, this is only true for the first identification attempt (e.g., the victim didn’t 
see the perpetrator in the news before viewing him in a lineup), and only if the suspect does not 
stand out unfairly (the lineup must be fair). Later expressions of confidence, like in the 
courtroom, are not related to accuracy and should be downplayed.               
Please look at the following image(s), which summarizes these ideas. The image shows how 
much weight, or importance, to give to the eyewitness confidence, depending on the confidence 
level itself and whether it came from a first, fair identification attempt. More weight, or 









 A pilot study was used to determine the appropriate visual aid for these experiments. The 
pilot study compared the performance of two visual aids, balance beam and icon arrays, both of 
which have been used successfully in other fields (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017; Hamm et 
al., 2014). These visual aids were compared to a control condition with no visual aid. 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were n = 387 workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and students from 
introductory psychology courses at University of Oklahoma, who were compensated a small 
amount for participation (<$5.00 for Turk, class credit for students).  
Design 
The design was a 2 (Transcript Strength: Strong, Weak) x 3 (Visual Aid: Balance Beam, Icon 
Array, Control) between-participants factorial.  
Materials & Procedure 
The Materials and Procedure were the same as those in Experiment 1, Full Sample. 
Results 
Regression models with the control as the reference class were used to determine 
significant differences across conditions. There were no significant differences in verdict 
decisions, χ2 (df = 7) = -270.26, p = .57, AIC = 554.52, r2 = .04. However, the Balance Beam 
produced a much higher difference (.26) between Strong and Weak transcripts (evidence of 
sensitivity), compared to the Control condition (.06). See Table 1. Likelihood of Guilt was also 
trending higher in the Balance Beam (M = 59.52, SD = 28.48) than the Control (M = 55.6, SD = 
27.37), t = 1.89, p = .059. No other differences across experimental manipulations occurred for 
any post-trial questionnaire item, usability, or workload metrics. Based on these results, 
indicating some sensitivity for the Balance Beam, it was chosen as the visual aid for these 
experiments.  
Table B.1 
Proportion of guilty verdicts across experimental manipulations 
  Strong Weak 
Strong-
Weak 
Control 0.43 0.37 0.06 
Balance Beam 0.56 0.30 0.26 





Modified Henderson Instructions 
You should consider the following factors that are related to the witness, the alleged perpetrator, 
and the criminal incident itself.   
1. The Witness’s Opportunity to View and Degree of Attention: In making this assessment you 
should consider the following:  
a. Stress: You should consider a witness’s level of stress and whether that stress, if any, 
distracted the witness or made it harder for him or her to identify the perpetrator.  
b. Duration: A brief or fleeting contact is less likely to produce an accurate identification 
than a more prolonged exposure to the perpetrator.                  
c. Weapon Focus: The presence of a weapon can distract the witness and take the 
witness’s attention away from the perpetrator's face. 
d. Distance: The greater the distance between an eyewitness and a perpetrator, the higher 
the risk of a mistaken identification.  
e. Lighting: Inadequate lighting can reduce the reliability of an identification.   
f. Disguises/Changed Appearance: Disguises like hats, sunglasses, or masks can reduce 
the accuracy of an identification. Similarly, changes in appearance (like to facial features, 
hair, or body weight) can reduce accuracy.                  
2. Prior Description of Perpetrator: Another factor for your consideration is the accuracy of any 
description the witness gave after observing the incident and before identifying the perpetrator. 
Did the prior description match the photo or person picked out later, did the prior description 
provide details or was it just general in nature, and was the witness's testimony at trial consistent 
with, or different from, the prior description of the perpetrator. 
3. Confidence and Accuracy: Eyewitness confidence is a very good predictor of accuracy. If an 
eyewitness is highly confident initially, they are very likely to be accurate. If an eyewitness is not 
confident initially, they are much less likely to be accurate. However, this is only true for the first 
identification attempt (e.g., the victim didn’t see the perpetrator in the news before viewing him 
in a lineup), and only if the suspect does not stand out unfairly (the lineup must be fair). Later 
expressions of confidence, like in the courtroom, are not related to accuracy and should be 
downplayed.   
4. Time Elapsed: Memories fade with time. In other words, the more time that passes, the greater 
the possibility that a witness’s memory of a perpetrator will weaken. In evaluating the reliability 




court identification was made, and whether it was the result of a suggestive procedure. You 
should consider the following factors:            
a. Line-up Composition: A suspect should not stand out from other members of the 
lineup.  
 
b. Fillers: Lineups should include a number of possible choices for the witness, 
commonly referred to as “fillers.” 
 
c. Multiple Viewings: When a witness views the same person in more than one 
identification procedure, it can be difficult to know whether a later identification comes 
from the witness’s memory of the original event or from an earlier exposure (e.g., saw in 
the new). You may consider whether the witness viewed the suspect multiple times 
during the identification process and, if so, whether that affected the reliability of the 
identification. 
In determining the reliability of the identification, you should also consider whether the 
identification procedure was properly conducted.                        
1. Double-blind: A lineup administrator who knows which person or photo in the lineup is the 
suspect may intentionally or unintentionally convey that knowledge to the witness. That 
increases the chance that the witness will identify the suspect, even if the suspect is innocent. For 
that reason, whenever feasible, live lineups and photo arrays should be conducted by an officer 
who does not know the identity of the suspect.  
 
2. Instructions: Identification procedures should begin with instructions to the witness that the 
perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup and that the witness should not feel compelled to 








Trial Transcript (adapted from Bradfield & McQuiston, 2004) 
Experimental Manipulations in Red Font, with the Weak Evidence condition in [brackets] 
 
People v. Roger Sanchez 
 
 Mr. Walker: Your Honor, the State would like to call Mrs. Edna Cameron to the witness stand. 
   
 Judge Cooper: Mrs. Cameron, if you could come up to the witness stand. If you’ll 
remain standing and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: I do. 
   
 Judge Cooper: Please state and spell your name for the Court and give your address. 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Edna D. Cameron, C-A-M-E-R-O-N. 1337 Ashton Blvd. Chicago. 
   
 Judge Cooper: Thank you. Please be seated. The prosecution may now begin examining the 
witness. 
  
 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MRS. CAMERON BY MR. WALKER: 
   
 Mr. Walker (prosecutor): Mrs. Cameron, could you please explain, in your own words, what 
happened on the morning of August 17th of last year? 
 
Mrs. Cameron: I was on my way to the bank when I passed the convenience store on Grand 
Avenue. 
   
 Mr. Walker: Around what time were you near the convenience store? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Well, the bank opens at 8 and I wanted to get there right when it opened so it 
was probably around 7:45. 
 
Mr. Walker: Was the lighting pretty good at that time?  
 
Mrs. Cameron: Yes.  
   




   
 Mrs. Cameron: Roger Sanchez came up from behind me and…. 
   
 Mr. Reeder (defense attorney): Objection, Your Honor.  My client is innocent until proven 
guilty.  I object to the witness naming him as the man who robbed her. 
   
 Judge Cooper: Objection sustained.  Mrs. Cameron, please do not refer to the man who robbed 
you as Mr. Sanchez.  Continue. 
   
 Mr. Walker:  So, Mrs. Cameron, a man came up behind you? 
 
Mrs. Cameron: Yes, he said “Give me your purse. I have a gun.”  Then I felt something poking 
into my back like a gun would.  I turned around slowly and handed my purse to him.   
 
Mr. Walker: I bet that was very stressful.  
 
Mrs. Cameron: Yes, it was scary.  
   
 Mr. Walker:  What did you do then? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: I walked into the convenience store and asked the clerk to call the police. 
   
 Mr. Walker: Describe the man you saw when you turned around to give him your purse. 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: He was about 5’10”, 200 pounds, with a beard, and he was wearing a red 
sweatshirt. 
 
Mr. Walker: And you saw him pretty close up, right? He was close enough for you to see? 
 
Mrs. Cameron: Yes, he was.  
 
Mr. Walker: Did he have anything covering his face?  
 
Mrs. Cameron: No, he didn’t.  
   
 Mr. Walker: How long did you look at him? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: A couple of seconds, I guess. 
   




   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes, I do. 
 
Mr. Walker: Mrs. Cameron, have you seen the man who robbed you since the morning of 
August 17th?  
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes. 
   
 Mr. Walker:  When was that? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: The police asked me to look at some pictures and try to pick out the person 
who robbed me. 
   
 Mr. Walker: And what happened? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: I picked out the picture of the person who robbed me. 
   
 Mr. Walker:  Is that person in this courtroom today? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes, he is. 
   
 Mr. Walker: Could you point him out, please? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: He’s sitting right over there. 
Mr. Walker: For the record, Mrs. Cameron pointed at the defendant, Roger Sanchez. Mrs. 
Cameron, how confident are you here today that Roger Sanchez is the man who robbed you? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: I’m 90% confident. 
   
 Mr. Walker: Thank you, Mrs. Cameron.  I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
  
 Judge Cooper: Mr. Reeder, your witness. 
   
 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MRS. CAMERON BY MR. REEDER: 
   
 Mr. Reeder (defense attorney):  Mrs. Cameron, am I correct when I say that you identified my 
client from a police lineup some time after the crime? 
  
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes, I did. 




 Mr. Reeder: And how long after the crime occurred did you make that identification? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: It was a few days later. 
Mr. Reeder: Did you indicate how confident you were at the time you initially made your 
identification? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes, I did. 
   
 Mr. Reeder: Judge Cooper, I would like to enter into evidence the statement that Mrs. Cameron 
made on the day of her identification.  
   
 Judge Cooper: Accepted as Exhibit A.  
   
 Mr. Reeder: Mrs. Cameron, is this the statement you completed on the date of the 
identification? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes, it is. 
   
 Mr. Reeder: Would you read what you wrote on the day of your identification for the court, 
please? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: I wrote “I picked out photograph #3. I am 90% [20%, Experiment 1; 50%, 
Experiment 2] confident that this is the guy who robbed me.” 
   
 Mr. Reeder: And you wrote this a few days after the robbery occurred, correct? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes, I did. 
Mr. Reeder: Ok. You testified that the man who robbed you came up from behind you, correct? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes. 
   
 Mr. Reeder:  So you didn’t see him approach you? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: No, I did not. 
   
 Mr. Reeder: So, overall, you didn’t look at the man for very long, did you? 
   
 Mrs. Cameron: Well…not very long, but he was right in front of me for a couple seconds. 
 




   
 Mrs. Cameron: Yes, I am. 
   
 Mr. Reeder: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
 
Experiment 2 Only 
Mr. Walker: Your Honor, the State would like to call Detective John Hale to the witness stand. 
   
 Judge Cooper: Detective Hale, if you could come up to the witness stand. If you’ll 
remain standing and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 
   
 Detective Hale: I do. 
   
 Judge Cooper: Please state and spell your name for the Court and give your address. 
   
 Mrs. Cameron John Hale. : H A L E 2039 West Oak Avenue. Chicago.  
   
 Judge Cooper: Thank you. Please be seated. The prosecution may now begin examining the 
witness. 
  
 DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE HALE BY MR. WALKER: 
Mr. Walker: Sir, are you a detective with the Chicago Metropolitan Police Department?  
 
Detective Hale: Yes sir.  
 
Mr. Walker: And how long have you been a police officer with this department?  
 
Detective Hale: 21 years.  
 
Mr. Walker: Have you become the lead investigator for the robbery of Mrs. Edna Cameron?  
 
Detective Hale: Yes.  
 
Mr. Walker: Okay. During the course of the investigation, did you have occasion to show the 
victim a lineup of individuals who may have committed the crime?  
 
Detective Hale: Yes, I made the lineup.  
 





Detective Hale: Sure. We have a large [small] database of mugshot photos that we use. As a 
result, we find a very good [very limited] set of photos that [sort of] match the suspect.   
 
Mr. Walker: Okay. Did she identify anyone from the lineup?    
 
Detective Hale: Yes, she chose our suspect, Roger Sanchez.  
 
Mr. Walker: And based on her identification from the lineup, you detained him and pressed 
charges?  
 
Detective Hale: That’s correct.  
 
Mr. Walker: I have no further questions, Your Honor.  
 
Judge Cooper: Mr. Reeder, your witness. 
   
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE HALE BY MR. REEDER: 
   
Mr. Reeder (defense attorney): Detective Hale, I want to talk more about the lineup.  
Do you think that the suspect stood out from other people in the lineup?  
 
Detective Hale: No, I don’t think he stands out. [Maybe. But we have a pretty small database of 
mugshot photos, so I wasn’t able to find many people who look like him. ] 
 
Mr. Reeder: When we look at lineup fairness, we normally think about things like gender, race, 
skin tone, hair color and style, and eye color. How many of the people in the lineup matched 
these features of the suspect?  
 
Detective Hale: I’d say all 5 of the other people in the lineup match the suspect’s features pretty 
well. [Well, only one or two. Again, it was hard to find other people who look like him].  
 
Mr. Reeder: Now I want to ask you about the exchange you had with the witness during the 
lineup. What did you ask the witness to do with the lineup? 
 
Detective Hale: I told her to choose who, if anyone, she thought was the perpetrator of her 
crime. She could have chosen nobody. [I told her that we had the suspect and she should “pick 
him out”.] 
 





Detective Hale: Yes, this is what we typically do.  
 
Mr. Reeder: One last thing. Did you stay in the room with the witness while she was looking at 
the lineup, or did you have another police officer administer it?  
 
Detective Hale: Another police officer administered it. This is our standard procedure. [I did it 
myself. I like to administer the lineups I make.]  
 
Mr. Reeder: And considering all this, you believe the witness correctly identified the perpetrator 
of her crime?  
 
Detective Hale: Yes, I do.  
 







For you to find this defendant guilty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this 
defendant is the person who committed the crime. You must determine, therefore, not only 
whether the State has proven the offenses charged, but also whether the State has proven that this 
defendant is the person who committed it. The State has presented the testimony of an 
eyewitness. You will recall that this witness identified the defendant in court as the person who 
committed the crime of armed robbery. The State also presented testimony that on a prior 
occasion before this trial, this witness identified the defendant as the person who committed 
these offenses.   
In evaluating this identification, you should consider the observations on which the identification 
was based, the witness’s ability to make those observations, and the circumstances under which 
the identification was made.   
Although you may wish for more evidence, the eyewitness is the primary source of evidence in 









    
Abbreviated Variable 
Name Description Response Options  
Verdict 
As a member of the jury, please provide 
your verdict decision below 1=guilty; 2=innocent  
Confidence In Verdict 
 
How confident are you in your verdict 
decision? 
1=not at all confident;  
10=very confident 
Likelihood of Guilt 
 
How likely do you think it is that Roger A. 
Sanchez, the defendant, actually  free response   
 
committed the crime? (Please type a 
percent from 0-100 in the line provided)   
Witness Accuracy 
 
Do you think Mrs. Cameron, the 
eyewitness, made an accurate 
identification of the perpetrator? 





Do you think the prosecution or defense’s 
case is stronger?  
1=defense's case is very  
strong; 5=both are  
equally strong;  
  





If Mr. Sanchez is convicted, what do you 
think his sentence should be? 
 
1=lightest possible  
sentence; 10=heaviest  
possible sentence 
Confidence In Witness 
How confident are you that Mrs. Cameron 
identified the correct man in the police 
line-up? 
1=not at all confident;  
10=very confident 
    
Initial Confidence 
Influenced Verdict 
How much was your verdict influenced by 
the confidence rating Mrs. Cameron gave 
at the time of her identification? 
1=not at all influenced;  
10=strongly influenced 
    
Courtroom Confidence 
Influenced Verdict 
How much was your verdict influenced by 
the confidence rating Mrs. Cameron gave 
at the trial? 
 

















At the time of her identification decision 
from the police line-up, how confident was  
10%-100% in 10%  
increments 
 
Mrs. Cameron that she identified the 
correct person?  
   
Courtroom Confidence 
Percentage 
At the time of the trial, how confident was 
Mrs. Cameron that she identified the 
correct person? 
 




Compared to how confident she was at the 
trial, do you remember whether Mrs. 
Cameron was more confident, less 
confident, or equally as confident when 
she first made her 
1=initial<courtroom;  
2=initial equal to  
courtroom; 3=initial >  
courtroom 
 
identification from the line-up? 
   
Good Look 
Do you think Mrs. Cameron got a good 
look at the culprit, based on the 
information you received about the 
robbery? 
1=not a good look;  
10=very good look 
    
Attention 
How much attention do you think Mrs. 
Cameron was paying to the culprit’s face 
when the crime occurred? 
 




To what extent do you feel that Mrs. 
Cameron had a good basis (enough 
information)  
1=no basis at all;  
10=a very good basis 
 
to make a good identification? 
   
Witness Memory 
How good of a memory for strangers’ 
faces do you believe Mrs. Cameron has? 
 
1=very poor; 




How often would you estimate that 
eyewitness identifications are correct, in 
general? 
 





How good of an indicator of eyewitness 
accuracy do you think eyewitness 
confidence is? 
 







Indicate the extent to which you agree with 
this statement: An eyewitness can be 
unsure about an identification made at the 
police line-up, but can become more 
confident in that identification over time. 
1=totally disagree;  
10=totally agree 
   
Confidence Inflation 
Equals Accuracy 
Indicate the extent to which you agree with 
this statement: An eyewitness who is 
unsure about their identification at the 
police line-up 
1=totally disagree;  
10=totally agree 
  
but then becomes more confident over time,  







Comprehension Check Items, correct answers in bold.  
Q1 What type of crime was the defendant on trial for? 
o Robbery  (1)  
o Murder  (2)  
o Sexual Assault  (3)  
 
Q2 The defendant was: 
o John Walker  (1)  
o Roger Sanchez  (2)  
o Edna Cameron  (3)  
 
Q3 Did the witness of the crime identify a suspect from the police lineup? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q4 What was the victim threatened with? 
o A knife  (1)  
o A baseball bat  (2)  










Please rank how you felt while you were weighing all the information presented to you about the 
case of People v. Sanchez. 0=strongly disagree, 10=strongly agree 
I found the information unnecessarily complex 
I thought the information was easy to understand 
I think I would need help from an expert to be able to understand the information 
I thought there was too much inconsistency in the information 
I would imagine that most people would be able to understand this information very 
quickly 
I felt very confident using this information to make a verdict decision 
WORKLOAD MEASURES 
Please rank how you felt while you were weighing all the information presented to you about the 
case of People v. Sanchez.  
How mentally demanding was the task? 0=very low, 10=very high 
How physically demanding was the task? 0=very low, 10=very high 
How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task? 0=very low, 10=very high 
How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to do? 0=perfect, 
10=failure 
How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of performance? 0=very low, 
10=very high 







Regression models and graphs for Full Sample results, Experiment 1, n = 687. Remember, 
not all items were completed by full sample of participants; Appendix J presents Subset of 
Sample results (including graphs).  
Table I.1.      
VERDICT 
  B SE z p 
(Intercept) 1.81 0.51 3.57 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.64 0.30 -5.49 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.36 0.30 -1.19 0.94 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.47 0.30 -1.57 0.69 
Gender -0.14 0.17 -0.84 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.01 -1.58 0.69 
Ethnicity 0.21 0.07 3.01 0.02 
Education 0.24 0.09 2.55 0.09 
Political Orientation -0.25 0.06 -3.89 0.00 
Income -0.20 0.09 -2.39 0.12 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.36 0.42 0.87 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. 
modified Henderson 0.38 0.41 0.92 1.00 






Figure I.1. Average VERDICT as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention type. Error 





Table I.2.     
CONFIDENCE IN VERDICT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.41 0.42 17.83 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.30 0.24 -1.23 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.10 0.25 0.42 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.10 0.25 -0.38 1.00 
Gender -0.06 0.14 -0.43 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.24 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.08 0.06 1.43 1.00 
Education 0.21 0.08 2.66 0.09 
Political Orientation -0.11 0.05 -2.15 0.32 
Income 0.00 0.07 -0.04 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.33 0.35 -0.93 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.09 0.35 0.27 1.00 







Figure I.2. Average CONFIDENCE IN VERDICT as a function of Transcript Strength and 





Table I.3.      
LIKELIHOOD OF GUILT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 81.55 5.80 14.05 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -21.48 3.41 -6.30 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -1.10 3.48 -0.32 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -2.21 3.50 -0.63 1.00 
Gender -2.16 1.97 -1.10 1.00 
Age 0.05 0.09 0.49 1.00 
Ethnicity 2.10 0.79 2.66 0.07 
Education 0.71 1.10 0.65 1.00 
Political Orientation -3.71 0.74 -5.03 0.00 
Income -0.38 1.00 -0.38 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.28 4.87 0.26 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.61 4.88 0.33 1.00 






      
 
Figure I.3. Average LIKELIHOOD OF GUILT as a function of Transcript Strength and 





Table I.4.      
CONFIDENCE IN WITNESS 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.83 0.63 15.49 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -2.96 0.37 -7.93 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.43 0.38 -1.14 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.63 0.38 -1.64 0.61 
Gender -0.42 0.22 -1.94 0.42 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.34 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.28 0.09 3.21 0.01 
Education 0.21 0.12 1.75 0.57 
Political Orientation -0.51 0.08 -6.31 0.00 
Income -0.07 0.11 -0.63 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.06 0.53 0.11 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.48 0.54 0.90 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 656) = 20.04, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .24 
 







Figure I.4. Average CONFIDENCE IN WITNESS as a function of Transcript Strength and 





Table I.5.      
INITIAL CONFIDENCE INFLUENCED VERDICT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 6.20 0.58 10.68 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.17 0.34 0.50 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.07 0.35 0.21 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.61 0.35 -1.72 0.94 
Gender 0.14 0.20 0.70 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.77 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.03 0.08 0.41 1.00 
Education 0.15 0.11 1.34 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.06 0.07 0.81 1.00 
Income 0.10 0.10 0.99 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.42 0.49 -0.86 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.69 0.50 1.39 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 597) = 1.27, p = .24, adjusted r2 = .005 







Figure I.5. Average INITIAL CONFIDENCE INFLUENCED VERDICT as a function of 






Table I.6.      
COURTROOM CONFIDENCE INFLUENCED VERDICT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.16 0.65 12.62 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.77 0.38 -4.63 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.27 0.39 0.70 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.19 0.39 -0.49 1.00 
Gender -0.25 0.22 -1.14 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.01 -1.10 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.27 0.09 2.98 0.03 
Education 0.10 0.12 0.85 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.26 0.08 -3.15 0.02 
Income -0.16 0.11 -1.42 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.03 0.54 -0.05 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.90 0.55 1.64 0.81 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 595) = 6.58, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .09 







Figure I.6. Average COURTROOM CONFIDENCE INFLUENCED VERDICT as a function of 





Table I.7.      
CONFIDENCE INFLATION EQUALS ACCURACY 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 5.82 0.58 10.05 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.20 0.34 -0.57 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.32 0.35 0.93 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.23 0.35 -0.65 1.00 
Gender -0.26 0.20 -1.32 1.00 
Age -0.02 0.01 -1.85 0.59 
Ethnicity 0.14 0.08 1.76 0.63 
Education 0.31 0.11 2.87 0.04 
Political Orientation -0.26 0.07 -3.56 0.00 
Income 0.02 0.10 0.21 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.32 0.49 -0.65 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.19 0.49 0.38 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 657) = 3.57, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .04 







Figure I.7. Average CONFIDENCE INFLATION EQUALS ACCURACY as a function of 






Table I.8.      
COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 3.37 0.14 23.42 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.12 0.08 1.46 0.73 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.01 0.09 0.12 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.13 0.09 1.44 0.73 
Gender 0.11 0.05 2.31 0.17 
Age 0.01 0.00 3.87 0.00 
Ethnicity -0.01 0.02 -0.36 1.00 
Education -0.14 0.03 -5.31 0.00 
Political Orientation 0.06 0.02 3.05 0.02 
Income 0.05 0.02 2.20 0.20 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.08 0.12 -0.70 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.19 0.12 -1.58 0.69 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 656) = 6.38, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .08 








Figure I.8. Average COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS as a function of Transcript 






Table I.9.      
INITIAL CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.53 0.44 21.88 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -5.45 0.26 -21.13 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.00 0.26 0.01 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.16 0.26 0.59 1.00 
Gender -0.24 0.15 -1.61 0.65 
Age -0.01 0.01 -1.87 0.44 
Ethnicity 0.08 0.06 1.31 0.95 
Education 0.18 0.08 2.12 0.31 
Political Orientation -0.14 0.06 -2.47 0.14 
Income -0.15 0.08 -1.92 0.44 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.08 0.37 -0.22 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.08 0.37 0.21 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 597) = 120.3, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .68 







Figure I.9. Average INITIAL CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE as a function of Transcript 





Table I.10.      
COURTROOM CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.76 0.30 29.20 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.26 0.18 -1.44 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.04 0.18 0.23 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.04 0.18 0.21 1.00 
Gender 0.09 0.10 0.84 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.00 1.25 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.11 0.04 -2.64 0.09 
Education -0.14 0.06 -2.42 0.16 
Political Orientation 0.04 0.04 0.97 1.00 
Income 0.06 0.05 1.24 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.39 0.25 -1.55 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.03 0.25 0.10 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 596) = 3.97, p < .0001, adjusted r2  = .05 





Figure I.10. Average COURTROOM CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE as a function of 





Table I.11.      
USABILITY 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.44 0.40 18.40 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.31 0.24 1.31 0.38 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.49 0.24 2.03 0.24 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.28 0.24 1.15 0.38 
Gender 0.28 0.14 2.07 0.24 
Age 0.04 0.01 6.51 0.00 
Ethnicity -0.10 0.05 -1.82 0.28 
Education -0.45 0.08 -5.92 0.00 
Political Orientation 0.22 0.05 4.26 0.00 
Income 0.19 0.07 2.69 0.06 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.55 0.34 -1.61 0.33 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.83 0.34 -2.42 0.11 
Note: Overall model fit, F (11, 657) = 12.29, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .16 







Figure I.11. Average USABILITY as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention type. 





Table I.12.      
WORKLOAD 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 5.72 0.41 14.11 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.10 0.24 -0.43 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.16 0.24 -0.68 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.13 0.24 -0.52 1.00 
Gender -0.15 0.14 -1.12 1.00 
Age -0.03 0.01 -4.61 0.00 
Ethnicity 0.10 0.06 1.74 0.66 
Education 0.53 0.08 6.93 0.00 
Political Orientation -0.27 0.05 -5.35 0.00 
Income -0.09 0.07 -1.24 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.23 0.34 -0.68 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.51 0.34 1.49 0.95 







Figure I.12. Average WORKLOAD as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention type. 






Regression models and graphs for Subset of Sample results, Experiment 1, n = 200. Graphs 
that appeared in Appendix I (Full Sample) are not repeated here.  
Table J.1.      
VERDICT 
  B SE z p 
(Intercept) 2.22 1.05 2.12 0.37 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.55 0.60 -2.57 0.13 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.18 0.59 0.30 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.69 0.58 -1.19 1.00 
Gender 0.36 0.34 1.08 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.70 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.03 0.13 0.20 1.00 
Education 0.31 0.19 1.64 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.05 0.12 0.45 1.00 
Income -0.48 0.18 -2.66 0.11 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.01 0.12 0.04 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.16 0.07 -2.39 0.20 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.47 0.90 -0.52 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.66 0.83 0.80 1.00 






Table J.2.      
CONFIDENCE IN VERDICT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 6.64 0.92 7.23 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.50 0.53 0.95 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 1.10 0.55 2.02 0.54 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.92 0.54 1.71 0.97 
Gender 0.14 0.29 0.49 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.64 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.25 0.12 2.18 0.40 
Education 0.20 0.16 1.24 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.17 0.11 -1.63 1.00 
Income 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.10 0.10 -1.02 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.02 0.06 -0.39 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -1.19 0.78 -1.53 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -1.01 0.73 -1.37 1.00 






Table J.3.      
LIKELIHOOD OF GUILT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 91.27 11.30 8.08 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -17.61 6.49 -2.71 0.10 
Key Intervention v. Control 2.47 6.71 0.37 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -3.23 6.65 -0.49 1.00 
Gender 2.63 3.57 0.74 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.18 -0.06 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.46 1.43 0.32 1.00 
Education 0.13 1.99 0.06 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.93 1.31 -0.71 1.00 
Income -1.52 1.83 -0.83 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.19 1.25 -0.15 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -1.75 0.71 -2.45 0.18 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -5.61 9.56 -0.59 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. 
modified Henderson -1.61 9.04 -0.18 1.00 






Table J.4.      
WITNESS ACCURACY 
        B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.66 0.99 9.70 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.42 0.57 -2.48 0.17 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.64 0.59 1.09 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.49 0.58 -0.84 1.00 
Gender 0.22 0.31 0.71 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.02 -0.13 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.12 0.13 0.94 1.00 
Education 0.14 0.18 0.80 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.09 0.12 -0.82 1.00 
Income -0.27 0.16 -1.70 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.05 0.11 -0.49 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.20 0.06 -3.23 0.02 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -1.28 0.84 -1.52 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.31 0.80 -0.38 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 3.39, p = .0001, 







Figure J.1. Average WITNESS ACCURACY as a function of Transcript Strength and 





Table J.5.      
CASE STRENGTH 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.63 1.15 7.54 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.03 0.66 -1.57 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.93 0.68 1.37 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.05 0.67 -0.07 1.00 
Gender 0.34 0.36 0.93 1.00 
Age -0.02 0.02 -1.14 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.07 0.14 0.49 1.00 
Education 0.32 0.20 1.60 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.27 0.13 -2.04 0.51 
Income -0.17 0.19 -0.89 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.07 0.13 0.54 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.20 0.07 -2.82 0.07 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -1.24 0.97 -1.28 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.26 0.92 -0.28 1.00 







Figure J.2. Average CASE STRENGTH as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention 





Table J.6.      
SENTENCE LENGTH RECOMMENDATION 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.96 1.03 8.69 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.21 0.59 -0.36 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.28 0.61 0.45 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.30 0.61 0.50 1.00 
Gender -0.19 0.33 -0.58 1.00 
Age 0.02 0.02 1.21 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.29 0.13 2.21 0.32 
Education -0.03 0.18 -0.17 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.42 0.12 -3.50 0.01 
Income 0.13 0.17 0.79 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.03 0.11 -0.24 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.21 0.07 -3.23 0.02 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -1.13 0.87 -1.29 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.76 0.83 -0.92 1.00 







Figure J.3. Average SENTENCE LENGTH RECOMMENDATION as a function of Transcript 





Table J.7.      
CONFIDENCE IN WITNESS 
Estimate B SE t p 
(Intercept) 11.70 1.16 10.12 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -2.65 0.66 -3.99 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.20 0.69 0.30 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.85 0.68 -1.25 1.00 
Gender -0.02 0.37 -0.04 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.02 0.11 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.37 0.15 2.54 0.13 
Education -0.02 0.20 -0.10 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.29 0.13 -2.19 0.30 
Income -0.24 0.19 -1.27 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.02 0.13 -0.17 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.21 0.07 -2.86 0.06 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.64 0.98 -0.65 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.27 0.93 0.29 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 8.19, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .33 





Table J.8.      
INITIAL CONFIDENCE INFLUENCE VERDICT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 5.93 1.10 5.40 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.26 0.65 0.40 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.36 0.65 -0.56 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.93 0.64 -1.46 1.00 
Gender 0.07 0.35 0.20 1.00 
Age 0.03 0.02 1.81 0.94 
Ethnicity 0.15 0.14 1.07 1.00 
Education 0.04 0.20 0.19 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.11 0.13 0.82 1.00 
Income 0.16 0.18 0.86 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.02 0.12 0.20 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.01 0.07 -0.18 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.44 0.95 -0.46 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.53 0.90 0.59 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 160) = .91, p = .54, adjusted r2 = -.007 





Table J.9.      
COURTROOM CONFIDENCE INFLUENCE VERDICT 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 10.78 1.15 9.36 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -2.27 0.69 -3.31 0.02 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.27 0.70 0.39 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.56 0.68 -0.82 1.00 
Gender 0.02 0.37 0.04 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.02 -0.52 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.20 0.15 1.33 1.00 
Education -0.08 0.20 -0.40 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.06 0.14 0.41 1.00 
Income -0.30 0.19 -1.57 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.23 0.13 -1.74 0.92 
Graph Literacy  -0.17 0.07 -2.24 0.32 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.11 1.00 -0.11 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.98 0.93 1.05 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 160) = 4.96, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .23  





Table J.10.      
GOOD LOOK 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.28 1.11 7.45 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.73 0.64 -1.14 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.36 0.66 0.54 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.64 0.65 -0.97 1.00 
Gender -0.04 0.35 -0.11 1.00 
Age 0.02 0.02 1.29 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.01 0.14 -0.10 1.00 
Education 0.20 0.20 1.02 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.01 0.13 -0.07 1.00 
Income -0.22 0.18 -1.20 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.12 0.12 -1.01 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.18 0.07 -2.52 0.17 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -1.42 0.94 -1.51 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.18 0.89 -0.20 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 3.03, p = .0005, adjusted r2 = .12 






Figure J.4. Average GOOD LOOK as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention type. 





Table J.11.      
ATTENTION 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.37 1.09 8.63 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.27 0.62 -2.04 0.43 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.15 0.64 0.23 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.64 0.64 -2.56 0.14 
Gender 0.20 0.34 0.58 1.00 
Age 0.02 0.02 0.95 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.08 0.14 0.55 1.00 
Education 0.20 0.19 1.03 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.01 0.13 -0.11 1.00 
Income -0.44 0.18 -2.51 0.14 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.00 0.12 -0.04 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.24 0.07 -3.46 0.01 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.50 0.92 -0.55 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. 
modified Henderson 0.88 0.87 1.01 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 4.20, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .18 







Figure J.5. Average ATTENTION as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention type. 





Table J.12.      
GOOD BASIS 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.78 1.12 7.81 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.26 0.65 -1.95 0.63 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.20 0.67 0.29 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.09 0.66 -1.65 1.00 
Gender 0.15 0.36 0.42 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.02 0.52 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.03 0.14 0.24 1.00 
Education 0.20 0.20 0.99 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.08 0.13 -0.62 1.00 
Income -0.23 0.18 -1.25 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.05 0.12 -0.40 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.18 0.07 -2.51 0.17 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -1.17 0.95 -1.24 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.16 0.90 0.18 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 3.66, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .16 






Figure J.6. Average GOOD BASIS as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention type. 





Table J.13.      
WITNESS MEMORY 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.65 0.94 8.16 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.55 0.54 -2.87 0.06 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.44 0.56 0.78 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.61 0.55 -1.10 1.00 
Gender 0.46 0.30 1.54 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.24 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.11 0.12 0.93 1.00 
Education 0.31 0.17 1.89 0.67 
Political Orientation -0.05 0.11 -0.47 1.00 
Income -0.22 0.15 -1.44 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.01 0.10 0.14 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.19 0.06 -3.15 0.03 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.60 0.79 -0.76 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.09 0.75 -0.12 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 5.61, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .24 






Figure J.7. Average WITNESS MEMORY as a function of Transcript Strength and Intervention 






Table J.14.      
EYEWITNESS ACCURACY GENERAL 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.25 0.79 10.38 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.16 0.46 -2.54 0.15 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.59 0.47 -1.26 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.17 0.47 -0.37 1.00 
Gender -0.25 0.25 -0.99 1.00 
Age 0.02 0.01 1.45 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.25 0.10 2.45 0.19 
Education -0.14 0.14 -0.96 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.14 0.09 -1.50 1.00 
Income 0.18 0.13 1.38 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.15 0.09 -1.68 0.94 
Graph Literacy  -0.10 0.05 -2.03 0.48 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.89 0.67 1.32 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.12 0.64 0.19 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 3.94, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .17 






Figure J.8. Average EYEWITNESS ACCURACY GENERAL as a function of Transcript 






Table J.15.      
CONFIDENCE INDICATOR ACCURACY 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.19 0.95 8.66 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.01 0.54 -1.87 0.77 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.38 0.56 -0.67 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.06 0.56 -0.11 1.00 
Gender 0.13 0.30 0.44 1.00 
Age 0.02 0.02 1.53 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.15 0.12 1.22 1.00 
Education 0.19 0.17 1.15 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.09 0.11 -0.84 1.00 
Income -0.09 0.15 -0.60 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.13 0.10 -1.23 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.17 0.06 -2.90 0.06 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.28 0.80 0.35 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.06 0.76 0.07 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 3.49, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .15 






Figure J.9. Average CONFIDENCE INDICATOR OF ACCURACY as a function of Transcript 






Table J.16.      
CONFIDENCE INFLATION OCCURS 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.29 1.22 5.98 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.14 0.70 -1.63 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.95 0.72 -1.31 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.12 0.72 -0.17 1.00 
Gender -0.40 0.39 -1.04 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.02 0.72 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.32 0.15 2.11 0.43 
Education 0.12 0.22 0.56 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.10 0.15 0.68 1.00 
Income -0.43 0.20 -2.11 0.43 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.04 0.14 -0.32 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.12 0.08 -1.51 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 2.29 1.03 2.22 0.36 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.59 0.98 0.61 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 172) = 1.96, p = .03, adjusted r2 = .06 






Figure J.10. Average CONFIDENCE INFLATION OCCURS as a function of Transcript 






Table J.17.      
CONFIDENCE INFLATION EQUALS ACCURACY 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.82 1.09 7.20 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.15 0.62 -0.24 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.07 0.64 -0.11 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.46 0.64 -0.72 1.00 
Gender 0.22 0.34 0.63 1.00 
Age -0.02 0.02 -1.24 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.20 0.14 1.48 1.00 
Education 0.02 0.19 0.12 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.02 0.13 0.20 1.00 
Income -0.04 0.18 -0.20 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.04 0.12 -0.31 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.23 0.07 -3.37 0.01 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.73 0.92 0.80 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.10 0.87 0.11 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F(13, 173) = 2.49, p = .0004, adjusted r2 = .09 





Table J.18.      
COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 3.08 0.18 17.02 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.08 0.10 0.77 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.04 0.11 -0.39 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.12 0.11 1.12 1.00 
Gender 0.16 0.06 2.85 0.06 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.61 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.04 0.02 1.57 1.00 
Education -0.02 0.03 -0.55 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.03 0.02 -1.24 1.00 
Income -0.03 0.03 -1.05 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.03 0.02 1.70 0.92 
Graph Literacy  0.04 0.01 3.89 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.15 0.15 -0.97 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.28 0.15 -1.95 0.58 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 3.82, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .16 





Table J.19.      
INITIAL CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 10.44 0.69 15.13 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -6.17 0.41 -15.20 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.17 0.41 0.43 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.20 0.40 0.51 1.00 
Gender -0.22 0.22 -0.99 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.25 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.24 0.09 2.77 0.08 
Education -0.12 0.12 -0.96 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.04 0.08 -0.45 1.00 
Income 0.01 0.12 0.11 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.13 0.08 -1.66 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.07 0.04 -1.69 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.32 0.59 0.53 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.30 0.56 0.53 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 160) = 57.62, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .81 





Table J.20.      
COURTROOM CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 6.84 0.51 13.29 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.30 0.31 -0.97 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.22 0.31 -0.69 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.08 0.30 0.27 1.00 
Gender 0.25 0.17 1.53 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 1.52 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.10 0.07 1.45 1.00 
Education -0.16 0.09 -1.76 0.88 
Political Orientation -0.02 0.06 -0.36 1.00 
Income 0.04 0.09 0.49 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.14 0.06 2.36 0.23 
Graph Literacy  0.11 0.03 3.27 0.02 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.43 0.44 -0.97 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.30 0.42 -0.73 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 160) = 4.39, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .20 





Table J.21.      
CONFIDENCE RANKING 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 2.22 0.21 10.46 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.85 0.12 -6.83 0.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.04 0.12 0.29 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.06 0.12 0.48 1.00 
Gender -0.11 0.07 -1.61 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.26 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.01 0.03 -0.36 1.00 
Education 0.01 0.04 0.35 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.02 0.02 -0.77 1.00 
Income 0.07 0.04 1.76 0.98 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.04 0.02 -1.72 0.98 
Graph Literacy  -0.01 0.01 -0.70 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.13 0.18 0.73 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.03 0.17 -0.16 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 123) = 11.76, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .51 






Figure J.11. Average CONFIDENCE RANKING as a function of Transcript Strength and 





Table J.22.      
USABILITY 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.165 0.737 9.725 0 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.18 0.42 -0.43 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.20 0.44 0.47 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.00 0.43 0.01 1.00 
Gender 0.66 0.23 2.85 0.06 
Age 0.02 0.01 1.68 0.95 
Ethnicity -0.02 0.09 -0.23 1.00 
Education -0.34 0.13 -2.63 0.10 
Political Orientation -0.11 0.09 -1.29 1.00 
Income -0.02 0.12 -0.16 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.11 0.08 1.36 1.00 
Graph Literacy  0.15 0.05 3.14 0.03 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.49 0.62 -0.79 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.61 0.59 -1.03 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 4.66, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .20 





Table J.23.      
WORKLOAD 
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 6.39 0.75 8.50 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.23 0.43 0.52 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.00 0.45 -0.01 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.31 0.44 -0.71 1.00 
Gender -0.17 0.24 -0.72 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.01 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.08 0.09 0.84 1.00 
Education 0.17 0.13 1.26 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.06 0.09 0.69 1.00 
Income 0.13 0.12 1.06 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.05 0.08 -0.54 1.00 
Graph Literacy  -0.19 0.05 -4.00 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.36 0.63 0.57 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.65 0.60 1.07 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (13, 173) = 3.34 p = .0001, 







Regression models and graphs, Experiment 2, n = 790 
Table K.1.      
VERDICT     
  B SE z p 
(Intercept) 3.66 0.58 6.32 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.50 0.41 -3.68 0.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.37 0.42 -0.88 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.79 0.39 -2.04 0.58 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.83 0.41 -2.00 0.59 
Gender -0.09 0.16 -0.59 1.00 
Age -0.02 0.01 -2.31 0.33 
Ethnicity 0.02 0.06 0.36 1.00 
Education 0.08 0.09 0.99 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.16 0.06 -2.67 0.13 
Income -0.13 0.08 -1.69 0.99 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.05 0.05 -1.08 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.13 0.03 -4.78 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.56 0.58 0.96 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.20 0.55 2.20 0.42 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. 
modified Henderson 1.10 0.58 1.88 0.71 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.33 0.55 0.60 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.08 0.59 -0.13 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.75 0.78 -0.96 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.79 0.83 -0.95 1.00 






Figure K.1. Average VERDICT percentage as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention 




Table K.2.      
CONFIDENCE IN VERDICT     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.82 0.47 20.96 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.40 0.34 -1.17 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.46 0.36 -1.28 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.92 0.33 -2.78 0.10 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.53 0.36 -1.46 1.00 
Gender -0.15 0.14 -1.09 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.97 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.07 0.05 -1.47 1.00 
Education 0.00 0.07 -0.03 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.04 0.05 -0.87 1.00 
Income 0.00 0.07 0.03 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.16 0.04 -3.82 0.00 
Graph Literacy -0.09 0.02 -3.73 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.50 0.49 1.02 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.12 0.47 0.25 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.47 0.50 0.93 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.06 0.48 2.21 0.44 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.35 0.51 0.69 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.57 0.68 -0.84 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.87 0.70 -1.24 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F ( 19, 707) = 4.91, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .09 
      
      







Figure K.2. Average CONFIDENCE IN VERDICT as a function of Transcript Strength, 




Table K.3.      
LIKELIHOOD OF GUILT      
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 87.26 6.77 12.89 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -7.49 4.94 -1.52 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) 1.29 5.16 0.25 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 1.26 4.80 0.26 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -4.82 5.18 -0.93 1.00 
Gender 0.59 2.00 0.30 1.00 
Age -0.10 0.09 -1.17 1.00 
Ethnicity -1.64 0.72 -2.29 0.38 
Education 1.58 1.05 1.49 1.00 
Political Orientation -2.78 0.73 -3.82 0.00 
Income -0.61 0.98 -0.62 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.11 0.60 -0.19 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.90 0.34 -2.68 0.14 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) -6.98 7.10 -0.98 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.49 6.76 -0.07 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 5.70 7.20 0.79 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control -6.90 6.95 -0.99 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -5.28 7.36 -0.72 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 12.47 9.76 1.28 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -2.33 10.17 -0.23 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 706) = 4.19, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .08 







Figure K.3. Average LIKELIHOOD OF GUILT as a function of Transcript Strength, 




Table K.4.      
WITNESS ACCURACY      
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.87 0.62 15.98 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.87 0.45 -4.13 0.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.76 0.47 -1.62 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.58 0.44 -1.31 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.14 0.47 -2.42 0.23 
Gender -0.07 0.18 -0.36 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.67 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.11 0.07 -1.70 1.00 
Education 0.14 0.10 1.47 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.18 0.07 -2.65 0.14 
Income -0.07 0.09 -0.83 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.06 0.05 -1.03 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.13 0.03 -4.26 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.76 0.65 1.17 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.06 0.62 1.72 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.70 0.66 2.59 0.16 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.25 0.63 0.39 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.47 0.67 0.70 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.65 0.89 -0.73 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.34 0.93 -1.45 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 704) = 5.35, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .10 







Figure K.4. Average WITNESS ACCURACY as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention 




Table K.5.      
CASE STRENGTH     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.85 0.63 15.53 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.66 0.46 -3.58 0.01 
Memory Test (Unfair) -1.00 0.48 -2.06 0.64 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.81 0.45 -1.80 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.70 0.49 -1.44 1.00 
Gender -0.08 0.19 -0.44 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.41 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.02 0.07 -0.23 1.00 
Education 0.20 0.10 1.99 0.70 
Political Orientation -0.23 0.07 -3.34 0.02 
Income -0.12 0.09 -1.33 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.07 0.06 -1.30 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.16 0.03 -5.18 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.84 0.67 1.26 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.14 0.63 1.80 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.01 0.68 1.49 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.17 0.65 1.80 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.31 0.69 0.44 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -1.20 0.91 -1.31 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.07 0.95 -1.12 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 6.47, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .13 






Figure K.5. Average CASE STRENGTH as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention type, 





Table K.6.      
SENTENCE LENGTH RECOMMENDATION     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.83 0.57 15.40 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.60 0.42 -1.42 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.06 0.44 -0.15 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.11 0.41 -0.27 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.65 0.44 -1.47 1.00 
Gender -0.19 0.17 -1.10 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.52 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.13 0.06 2.13 0.50 
Education 0.24 0.09 2.66 0.14 
Political Orientation -0.27 0.06 -4.31 0.00 
Income -0.13 0.08 -1.55 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.06 0.05 -1.09 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.19 0.03 -6.65 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) -0.13 0.60 -0.21 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.11 0.57 0.20 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.10 0.61 1.80 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.48 0.59 -0.82 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.68 0.62 1.09 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 0.68 0.83 0.82 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.96 0.86 -2.28 0.37 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 9.04, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .17 







Figure K.6. Average SENTENCE LENGTH RECOMMENDATION as a function of Transcript 






Table K.7.      
CONFIDENCE IN WITNESS     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 10.83 0.71 15.17 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.98 0.52 -3.80 0.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.28 0.55 -0.52 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.43 0.51 -0.84 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.96 0.55 -1.76 1.00 
Gender -0.18 0.21 -0.83 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.83 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.03 0.08 0.37 1.00 
Education 0.15 0.11 1.33 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.29 0.08 -3.73 0.00 
Income -0.08 0.10 -0.73 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.06 0.06 -0.93 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.15 0.04 -4.18 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.25 0.75 0.33 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.61 0.71 0.86 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.45 0.76 1.90 0.92 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.37 0.73 -0.51 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.05 0.78 -0.07 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 0.55 1.03 0.53 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.37 1.07 -1.28 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 6.45, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .12 







Figure K.7. Average CONFIDENCE IN WITNESS as a function of Transcript Strength, 





Table K.8.      
INITIAL CONFIDENCE INFLUENCE VERDICT     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.07 0.65 13.94 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.16 0.48 0.34 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.76 0.49 -1.53 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -1.40 0.45 -3.07 0.04 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.85 0.49 -1.74 1.00 
Gender -0.04 0.19 -0.23 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 1.50 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.15 0.07 -2.19 0.47 
Education 0.16 0.10 1.54 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.21 0.07 -2.89 0.07 
Income -0.04 0.10 -0.40 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.12 0.06 1.96 0.71 
Graph Literacy -0.11 0.03 -3.42 0.01 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.19 0.69 0.27 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.74 0.65 1.14 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.74 0.69 1.08 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.34 0.66 2.02 0.65 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.17 0.71 -0.25 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.76 0.95 -0.80 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.11 0.99 0.11 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F ( 19, 624) = 3.86, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .08 







Figure K.8. Average INITIAL CONFIDENCE INFLUENCED VERDICT as a function of 






Table K.9.      
COURTROOM CONFIDENCE INFLUENCE VERDICT     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 10.19 0.68 14.95 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.25 0.50 -2.53 0.20 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.44 0.52 -0.85 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.19 0.48 -0.40 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.00 
Gender -0.17 0.20 -0.87 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.01 -1.07 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.02 0.07 0.24 1.00 
Education 0.10 0.11 0.88 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.31 0.07 -4.19 0.00 
Income -0.02 0.10 -0.16 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.01 0.06 -0.13 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.19 0.03 -5.44 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.23 0.71 0.32 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.16 0.68 1.71 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.80 0.74 1.09 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.54 0.70 0.77 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.70 0.75 -0.93 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.52 0.98 -0.53 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.29 1.04 -0.28 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F ( 19, 653) = 6.03, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .12 







Figure K.9. Average COURTROOM CONFIDENCE INFLUENCED VERDICT as a function 






Table K.10.      
GOOD LOOK     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.75 0.64 15.13 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.76 0.47 -3.73 0.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.61 0.49 -1.24 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.97 0.46 -2.11 0.46 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.55 0.49 -3.14 0.03 
Gender -0.16 0.19 -0.86 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.04 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.05 0.07 -0.67 1.00 
Education 0.24 0.10 2.34 0.27 
Political Orientation -0.28 0.07 -3.97 0.00 
Income -0.09 0.09 -0.98 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.04 0.06 -0.71 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.17 0.03 -5.18 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.66 0.68 0.97 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.18 0.64 1.84 0.79 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.75 0.69 2.56 0.16 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.27 0.66 0.41 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.66 0.70 0.94 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.58 0.93 -0.62 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.52 0.97 -1.57 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 6.55, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .13 







Figure K.10. Average GOOD LOOK as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention type, and 





Table K.11.      
ATTENTION     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.21 0.63 14.65 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.55 0.46 -3.38 0.01 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.47 0.48 -0.98 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.62 0.45 -1.38 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.12 0.48 -2.34 0.31 
Gender 0.09 0.19 0.46 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.56 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.06 0.07 -0.85 1.00 
Education 0.23 0.10 2.34 0.31 
Political Orientation -0.24 0.07 -3.48 0.01 
Income -0.08 0.09 -0.83 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.07 0.06 -1.28 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.18 0.03 -5.64 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.64 0.66 0.98 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.91 0.63 1.45 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.08 0.67 1.61 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.41 0.64 0.63 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.13 0.68 0.19 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.86 0.91 -0.95 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.48 0.95 -0.51 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F ( 19, 707) = 6.67, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .13 







Figure K.11. Average ATTENTION as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention type, and 





Table K.12.      
GOOD BASIS     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 10.02 0.62 16.13 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.49 0.45 -3.27 0.02 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.42 0.47 -0.88 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.65 0.44 -1.48 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.00 0.48 -2.10 0.58 
Gender -0.13 0.18 -0.72 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.13 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.10 0.07 -1.53 1.00 
Education 0.18 0.10 1.87 0.87 
Political Orientation -0.25 0.07 -3.68 0.01 
Income -0.07 0.09 -0.82 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.08 0.06 -1.50 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.18 0.03 -5.98 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.39 0.65 0.60 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 1.04 0.62 1.68 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. 
modified Henderson 1.36 0.66 2.06 0.60 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.23 0.64 0.36 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.21 0.68 0.32 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.51 0.90 -0.57 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.85 0.93 -0.91 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 7.28, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .14 





Figure K.12. Average GOOD BASIS as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention type, and 





Table K.13.      
WITNESS MEMORY     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.04 0.59 15.34 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -1.54 0.43 -3.61 0.01 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.26 0.45 -0.57 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.26 0.42 -0.62 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.15 0.45 -2.56 0.15 
Gender -0.01 0.17 -0.07 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.05 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.03 0.06 -0.46 1.00 
Education 0.24 0.09 2.65 0.13 
Political Orientation -0.20 0.06 -3.17 0.03 
Income -0.09 0.09 -1.00 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.09 0.05 -1.73 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.16 0.03 -5.46 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.56 0.62 0.91 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.50 0.59 0.85 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 1.66 0.62 2.66 0.13 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.15 0.60 -0.25 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.48 0.64 0.75 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.23 0.85 -0.27 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -1.54 0.88 -1.74 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 705) = 7.27, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .14 







Figure K.13. Average WITNESS MEMORY as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention 





Table K.14.      
EYEWITNESS ACCURACY GENERAL     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.53 0.42 20.13 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.39 0.31 -1.27 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.26 0.30 -0.87 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.53 0.32 -1.64 1.00 
Gender -0.07 0.12 -0.53 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.25 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.03 0.04 0.65 1.00 
Education 0.17 0.07 2.63 0.15 
Political Orientation -0.24 0.05 -5.35 0.00 
Income -0.01 0.06 -0.16 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.06 0.04 -1.56 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.12 0.02 -5.90 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) -0.07 0.44 -0.15 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.02 0.42 0.04 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.28 0.45 0.63 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.34 0.43 -0.77 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.21 0.46 0.46 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 0.72 0.61 1.18 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.48 0.64 -0.76 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 8.18, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .16 






Figure K.14. Average EYEWITNESS ACCURACY GENERAL as a function of Transcript 







Table K.15.      
CONFIDENCE INDICATOR OF ACCURACY      
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.22 0.49 16.71 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.27 0.36 -0.75 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.36 0.37 -0.97 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.45 0.35 -1.29 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.50 0.38 -1.32 1.00 
Gender 0.22 0.15 1.52 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 1.73 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.03 0.05 0.53 1.00 
Education 0.14 0.08 1.85 1.00 
Political Orientation -0.27 0.05 -5.03 0.00 
Income 0.01 0.07 0.14 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.05 0.04 -1.09 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.12 0.02 -4.81 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.15 0.52 0.29 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.38 0.49 -0.77 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.00 0.52 0.01 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.08 0.50 0.15 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.51 0.53 0.95 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 0.72 0.71 1.01 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.32 0.74 -0.43 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 705) = 6.00, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .12 





Figure K.15. Average CONFIDENCE INDICATOR OF ACCURACY as a function of 






Table K.16.      
CONFIDENCE INFLATION OCCURS     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.94 0.65 12.22 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.29 0.47 -0.62 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.19 0.50 -0.39 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.14 0.46 0.30 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.38 0.50 -0.76 1.00 
Gender -0.14 0.19 -0.75 1.00 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.81 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.01 0.07 -0.08 1.00 
Education 0.28 0.10 2.79 0.10 
Political Orientation -0.14 0.07 -1.95 0.88 
Income -0.11 0.09 -1.20 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.01 0.06 -0.22 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.16 0.03 -5.03 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.50 0.68 0.73 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.17 0.65 0.26 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.98 0.69 1.42 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.44 0.67 0.66 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.60 0.71 0.85 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.10 0.94 -0.10 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.89 0.98 -0.91 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 706) = 3.90, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .07 







Figure K.16. Average CONFIDENCE INFLATION OCCURS as a function of Transcript 






Table K.17.      
CONFIDENCE INFLATION EQUALS ACCURACY      
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.49 0.58 12.93 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.54 0.42 1.28 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) 0.33 0.44 0.75 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.81 0.41 1.97 0.79 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.01 0.44 -0.02 1.00 
Gender -0.10 0.17 -0.61 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.09 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.01 0.06 -0.15 1.00 
Education 0.25 0.09 2.72 0.11 
Political Orientation -0.21 0.06 -3.42 0.01 
Income 0.03 0.08 0.42 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.08 0.05 -1.61 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.18 0.03 -6.08 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) -0.52 0.61 -0.85 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.76 0.58 -1.32 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.23 0.62 0.37 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.76 0.59 -1.28 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.04 0.63 -0.07 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 1.53 0.83 1.84 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.20 0.87 -0.23 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 706) = 7.22, p  < .0001, adjusted r2 = .14 







Figure K.17. Average CONFIDENCE INFLATION EQUALS ACCURACY as a function of 






Table K.18.      
COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 2.89 0.12 24.09 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.14 0.09 -1.61 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.01 0.09 -0.12 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.10 0.09 -1.20 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.07 0.09 -0.76 1.00 
Gender 0.10 0.04 2.73 0.10 
Age 0.00 0.00 1.62 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.02 0.01 -1.31 1.00 
Education -0.07 0.02 -3.75 0.00 
Political Orientation 0.04 0.01 2.83 0.08 
Income 0.02 0.02 1.41 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.03 0.01 2.58 0.15 
Graph Literacy 0.06 0.01 9.70 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.01 0.13 0.04 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.18 0.12 1.52 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.13 0.13 1.06 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.15 0.12 1.23 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.00 0.13 -0.02 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.05 0.17 -0.28 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.04 0.18 0.22 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 15.34, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .27 





Figure K.18. Average COMPREHENSION CHECK QUESTIONS as a function of Transcript 







Table K.19.      
INITIAL CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 9.89 0.28 34.75 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -2.94 0.21 -14.07 0.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) 0.05 0.22 0.24 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.23 0.20 -1.17 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.17 0.21 0.80 1.00 
Gender -0.02 0.08 -0.23 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.00 -2.50 0.20 
Ethnicity -0.06 0.03 -1.96 0.76 
Education 0.12 0.04 2.60 0.16 
Political Orientation -0.04 0.03 -1.24 1.00 
Income -0.06 0.04 -1.42 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.02 0.03 -0.78 1.00 
Graph Literacy -0.06 0.01 -4.20 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) -0.42 0.30 -1.38 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.10 0.29 -0.35 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.33 0.30 -1.10 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.25 0.29 0.87 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.28 0.31 -0.90 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 0.42 0.42 1.01 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.47 0.43 1.09 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 625) = 75.17, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .69 





Figure K.19. Average INITIAL CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE as a function of Transcript 







Table K.20.      
COURTROOM CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 7.84 0.19 40.74 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) 0.07 0.14 0.48 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) 0.03 0.15 0.23 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.11 0.14 -0.85 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.22 0.15 1.44 1.00 
Gender 0.16 0.06 2.74 0.11 
Age 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.00 
Ethnicity -0.05 0.02 -2.29 0.36 
Education -0.05 0.03 -1.47 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.01 0.02 0.58 1.00 
Income 0.01 0.03 0.40 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.05 0.02 2.61 0.16 
Graph Literacy 0.05 0.01 5.26 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) -0.20 0.20 -1.01 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.03 0.19 0.15 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.25 0.21 -1.19 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.11 0.20 0.55 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.26 0.21 -1.23 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 0.04 0.28 0.13 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.44 0.29 1.52 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 653) = 6.12, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .13 







Figure K.20. Average COURTROOM CONFIDENCE PERCENTAGE as a function of 






Table K.21.      
CONFIDENCE RANKING     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 2.20 0.14 15.29 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.65 0.10 -6.36 0.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) 0.03 0.11 0.30 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control 0.01 0.11 0.11 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.05 0.11 -0.42 1.00 
Gender -0.04 0.04 -0.89 1.00 
Age 0.00 0.00 -1.25 1.00 
Ethnicity 0.02 0.02 1.23 1.00 
Education 0.00 0.02 0.14 1.00 
Political Orientation 0.03 0.02 1.66 1.00 
Income 0.02 0.02 0.90 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.03 0.01 -2.66 0.15 
Graph Literacy -0.01 0.01 -2.04 0.71 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.05 0.15 -0.33 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.03 0.15 0.20 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control -0.04 0.15 -0.25 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson -0.08 0.16 -0.50 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control 0.03 0.21 0.14 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson 0.07 0.22 0.31 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 526) = 13.91, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .31 







Figure K.21. Average CONFIDENCE RANKING as a function of Transcript Strength, 





Table K.22.      
USABILITY     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 6.28 0.38 16.75 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.59 0.27 -2.15 0.41 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.40 0.29 -1.41 0.95 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.57 0.27 -2.15 0.41 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.34 0.29 -1.20 1.00 
Gender 0.31 0.11 2.78 0.09 
Age 0.02 0.00 3.97 0.00 
Ethnicity -0.14 0.04 -3.50 0.01 
Education -0.28 0.06 -4.76 0.00 
Political Orientation 0.09 0.04 2.34 0.28 
Income 0.05 0.05 1.01 1.00 
Numeracy (BNT-S) 0.07 0.03 2.06 0.41 
Graph Literacy 0.20 0.02 10.48 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.84 0.39 2.13 0.41 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.63 0.37 1.67 0.76 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.35 0.40 0.87 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.64 0.38 1.67 0.76 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.27 0.41 0.66 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -1.11 0.54 -2.06 0.41 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.51 0.56 -0.90 1.00 
Note: Overall model fit, F (19, 707) = 18.63, p < .0001, adjusted r2 = .32 







Figure K.22. Average USABILITY as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention type, and 





Table K.23.      
WORKLOAD     
  B SE t p 
(Intercept) 8.59 0.38 22.78 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak) -0.32 0.28 -1.15 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair) -0.35 0.29 -1.21 1.00 
Key Intervention v. Control -0.24 0.27 -0.90 1.00 
Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.26 0.29 -0.89 1.00 
Gender -0.07 0.11 -0.67 1.00 
Age -0.01 0.00 -3.02 0.04 
Ethnicity 0.14 0.04 3.51 0.01 
Education 0.38 0.06 6.41 0.00 
Political Orientation -0.25 0.04 -6.12 0.00 
Income -0.10 0.05 -1.88 0.85 
Numeracy (BNT-S) -0.06 0.03 -1.79 0.97 
Graph Literacy -0.22 0.02 -11.50 0.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Memory Test (Unfair) 0.17 0.40 0.43 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.31 0.38 0.82 1.00 
Transcript Strength (Weak)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.52 0.40 1.30 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. Control 0.11 0.39 0.28 1.00 
Memory Test (Unfair)*Key Intervention v. modified 
Henderson 0.66 0.41 1.61 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. Control -0.18 0.54 -0.33 1.00 
Weak*Unfair*Key Intervention v. modified Henderson -0.92 0.57 -1.63 1.00 







Figure K.23. Average WORKLOAD as a function of Transcript Strength, Intervention type, and 
Memory Test Fairness. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
